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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON EXCHANGE RATE AND CAPITAL CONTROLS 
 
This dissertation consists of essays that study exchange rate pass-through, China’s 
de facto exchange rate regime, and China’s capital controls.  
The first essay studies exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) by using a set of data 
from ten countries including four advanced economies and six Asian emerging markets. 
The price indices used in this essay include consumer price, producer price, import price 
and export price indices. While most literature only include the import price index, this 
essay also puts emphasis on the export price index. It investigates the asymmetry in the 
ERPT between depreciation and appreciation of domestic currency by using a non-linear 
OLS model; meanwhile, the short-run and long-run effects of ERPT are also compared 
with each other. It also detects possible structural change in the ERPT and finds most 
structural change points are around the Great Recession and Asia financial crisis. Finally, 
a VAR model is developed to detect the impulse responses of prices to exchange rate shock.   
The second essay is about China’s exchange rate regime. It has changed a lot since 
the 2005 reform. It is interesting and important to investigate China’s de facto exchange 
rate regime with the most recent data. This essay follows Frankel and Wei’s (2008) method, 
by applying both the basic model and new model with the exchange market pressure (EMP) 
variable to currency basket for the Chinese yuan exchange rate. I select the US dollar, the 
Euro, the British pound, the Japanese yen, the Canadian dollar, the Australian dollar and 
the Russian ruble as component currencies of the basket, based on free floaters, GDP and 
trade volume. I also add results from a VAR model, considering the endogeneity issue, and 
the results are consistent with those of OLS. I find the weight of the US dollar declines 
dramatically and the variation of the Chinese yuan becomes much larger after 2015. This 
implies that China has been transferring its exchange rate regime from dollar pegged to 
free floating.  
The third essay investigates the effectiveness of China’s capital controls. In recent 
years, after 2014, China’s foreign reserves declined dramatically, from 4 trillion US dollars 
to 3 trillion US dollars. There was a huge amount of capital outflows from China during 
2015 to 2016. This phenomenon lets us reconsider the question: Are China’s capital 
controls still effective? I will use five methods to measure the effectiveness of China’s 
     
 
capital controls, including de jure indicators, saving-investment correlation test, covered 
interest rate parity, real interest rate differentials and Edwards-Kahn model. The de jure 
indicators I use are from Fernández et al. (2016) and Chinn and Ito (2008). I compare China 
with the US, the UK and Japan in the saving-investment correlation test, and with the 
Eurozone and Japan in covered interest rate parity, real interest rate differentials and 
Edwards-Kahn model. Various results indicate that China’s capital controls are still 
effective. 
 
KEYWORDS: Exchange Rate Pass-Through, De Facto Exchange Rate Regime, Currency 
Basket, China, Capital Controls 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The exchange rate plays an important role in international macroeconomics, which 
can affect the international price system, trade and capital flows. Capital controls are 
policies adopted by many countries, especially developing countries, to control 
international capital flows, in order to isolate domestic and foreign capital market and 
stabilize the domestic economy. There are a number of issues in these areas that need to 
be investigated. My dissertation focuses on three topics related to exchange rate pass-
through, China’s de facto exchange rate regime and China’s capital controls.  
In the first essay, I study exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) on different price 
indices. The ERPT measures the effect on international prices of the changes in the 
exchange rate. Most existing literature focus on response of import price to exchange rate 
change, e.g. Campa and Goldberg (2002, 2005), Dixit (1989), Gagnon and Mandel (2014). 
But they neglect the fact that the export country may also change its export price as a 
response to the exchange rate change. In this essay, I add export price index (XPI) as one 
of the price indicators, along with consumer price index (CPI), producer price index (PPI), 
and import price index (MPI), in order to see how exchange rate can affect all of these 
price indices. Second, most literature neglect that the difference between appreciation and 
depreciation, and response of price indices can be asymmetric. For example, when 
domestic currency appreciates, the home exporter may lower her export price in order to 
keep her product as competitive as before; but when the domestic currency depreciates, 
with her export product more competitive already, the exporter may just keep her export 
price unchanged in domestic currency. Therefore, the asymmetry in response of price 
indices to exchange rate can be ascribed to the different level of sensitivity to appreciation 
and depreciation. In order to distinguish the difference, I use dummy variables to indicate 
appreciation and depreciation. The result affirms the existence of asymmetry in response 
for all the price indices I use.  
Moreover, changes in international finance environment, e.g. reform of exchange 
rate regime or major financial crisis, can also influence ERPT. Therefore, structural 
changes are expected to be found in the response series after most countries experienced 
several financial crises and some experienced exchange rate regime reform in recent 
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decades. I use Bai-Perron test to detect possible structural break points in ERPT. The result 
shows that many break points are around the time of Asia financial crisis and the Great 
Recession, although the time of break point is different across countries. However, the 
direction of change in ERPT is not consistent from country to country so specific structural 
change by the break needs to be analyzed individually. Furthermore, because of 
endogeneity issues, standard ordinary least squares (OLS) method may be not enough to 
identify this problem fully. So, treating all the variables as endogenous variables, I use a 
vector autoregression (VAR) model to estimate the response of price indices to exchange 
rate shock. Same as OLS results above, the impulse results of the VAR model also suggest 
that the response of price indices is negative, which is consistent with the prediction of 
theories. 
The second essay studies China’s de facto exchange rate regime. Despite reforms 
and changes, China’s official exchange rate regime is still what was claimed at the 
beginning of the reform, as “a managed floating exchange rate regime based on market 
supply and demand with reference to a basket of currencies”. 1 However, component 
currencies of the basket and their corresponding weights are never publicly revealed.2 
Thus we need to find a way to determine the currency basket. Moreover, the People's Bank 
of China (PBOC) does not say the yuan exchange rate is determined by, but “with 
reference to”, a basket. This seems to imply that the Chinese central bank may not be 
pegged to the basket, but instead employs a crawling peg to the US dollar instead. Just 
when most other currencies in the basket appreciate against the US dollar, China will adjust 
the yuan to appreciate against the US dollar as well. PBOC also says that it is “a managed 
floating regime based on market supply and demand”. So, whenever there is excessive 
supply or demand of the US dollar, the central bank may buy or sell the US dollar to 
intervene in the market. The purpose of this paper is to estimate China’s de facto exchange 
rate policy and investigate the composition and weights in PBOC’s currency basket. 
                                                 
1 The definition of China’s exchange rate regime can be found in Xiaochuan Zhou’s, the former 
governor of China’s central bank, speech: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20070610031235/http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6500&ID=82 
2 Some studies such as Frank and Wei (2008) and Cui (2012, 2014) use a basket of eleven 
currencies based on the speech in 2005 by Xiaochuan Zhou. But what he meant was that the eleven 
countries were the most important trade partners of China, so currencies of those countries were the major 
considerations in the determination of the basket. However, that does not necessarily mean currencies in the 
basket are the same as the eleven currencies. 
3 
 
Frankel and Wei (1994) introduce a basic regression model to estimate the weights 
of currencies in a basket. This popular method has been employed to investigate the 
currency basket of the Chinese yuan in empirical studies by Shah, Zeileis and Patnaik 
(2005), and Cui (2012, 2014), to name a few. Frankel and Wei (2008) have upgraded their 
model to a so-called new technique model by adding the exchange market pressure (EMP) 
variable as a regressor, compared to the old technique basic model. In most of those 
literature, they find the Chinese yuan is still pegged to the US dollar, but not to a currency 
basket, although the weight of the US dollar may have declined a bit. However, most 
literature are relatively old, so they cannot reflect the newest change of China’s exchange 
rate regime. In fact, China has announced a lot of significant exchange policy change and 
move the reform forward in most recent years. Thus it will be interesting to investigate the 
de facto exchange rate regime in China with the most recent data, especially with the 
Frankel and Wei’s (2008) new technique. In this essay, both the old basic model and the 
new model with the EMP variable are used to investigate the Chinese yuan exchange rate, 
to find China’s de facto exchange rate regime. A VAR model is employed also to check 
the robustness of the results while avoiding the potential endogeneity biases. 
In recent years, we have seen a significant decline in China’s foreign exchange 
reserves.3 It has fallen from a peak of nearly 4 trillion US dollars in 2014 to around 3 
trillion US dollars today. The sharp decline in foreign reserves might be due to sudden 
stops in capital inflows that are related to concerns about China’s economic development 
and future. Therefore, the third essay studies whether China’s capital controls are still 
effective. The theoretical origin of capital controls comes from “the Impossible Trinity,” 
according to which a country cannot achieve the three policy objectives at the same time: 
a fixed exchange rate, free capital mobility, and an independent monetary policy. The 
hypothesis can be traced to the Mundell and Fleming in the 1960s. It is further developed 
and explained by Krugman in 1999. It implies that a country like China that has chosen a 
fixed exchange rate may not enjoy independent monetary policy and free capital mobility. 
There is no universally accepted method to measure the effectiveness of capital 
controls in the literature. Using only one method to measure capital mobility or capital 
controls effectiveness may be inaccurate and unreliable. (Montiel, 1994) So we need to 
                                                 
3 See Figure 4.1 
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use more than one method to study the effectiveness of China’s capital controls. The 
existing research on the measurement of the effectiveness of capital controls can be 
roughly divided into two categories: De Jure and De Facto. The former reflects the 
regulation of capital account transactions by the administrative authorities of a country 
through policies and regulations; the latter reflects the actual capital flows of a country. 
De jure methods are the nominal capital controls intensity of a country, so it mainly focuses 
on how strict a country’s capital controls are, but it does not mean those controls are 
effective actually. While de facto methods measure how economic and financial variables, 
like interest rate, are affected by capital controls, so those methods put more emphasis on 
the effectiveness of capital controls. Because I want to measure the effectiveness of 
China’s capital controls, I will use de jure data to show how strict China’s capital controls 
are, and then use de facto methods to check its effectiveness in this chapter. To better 
investigate this question, this chapter comprehensively uses the de jure indicators, the 
saving-investment correlation test, covered interest rate parity, real interest rate 
differentials and the Edwards-Kahn model, on the perspective of government regulations, 
real economy, short-term capital arbitrage motives, and monetary economy respectively. 
The rest of the dissertation consists of the three essays in the following three 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2. EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Introduction 
The exchange rate can be considered as the external value of one currency in terms 
of another currency, while the price level measures the internal value of the currency in 
terms of goods and services. Naturally, we want to know how these two kinds of value are 
related to each other. The relationship between exchange rate and price has been an 
important topic in economics literature for a long time. The basic idea behind the 
connection between them can be originated from purchasing power parity (PPP): Same 
goods should have the same value measured by either domestic currency or foreign 
currency when the exchange rate between these two currencies is at the equilibrium level. 
However, this is not always the case in the real world due to a lot of other factors involved, 
such as transportation cost, tariff, and the market structure. As a revision of PPP, therefore, 
relative purchasing power parity indicates that price changes across countries, rather than 
price itself, should be the same when exchange rate is at the equilibrium level. In other 
words, foreign price needs to be adjusted by the same magnitude as the change in exchange 
rate, given domestic price remains unchanged. This idea leads to the concept of exchange 
rate pass-through (ERPT).  
The ERPT measures the effect on international prices of the changes in the 
exchange rate. Under the circumstance of a complete exchange rate pass-through, foreign 
price will rise by 1 percent when domestic currency appreciates by 1 percent, given 
domestic price remains unchanged. In reality, however, the ERPT is likely to be 
incomplete, and a 1 percent change in exchange rate leads to less than a 1 percent change 
in international prices. However, the specific change in price responding to the change in 
exchange rate (or called the level of ERPT) varies over time and across countries. 
Measurement of ERPT is important in international macroeconomics. It influences 
balance of trade, macroeconomic fluctuation, and transmission of monetary policy to price. 
While voluminous studies have been produced in the area of ERPT as briefly summarized 
in the brief literature review below, this chapter makes the following four contributions to 
the literature. 
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First of all, most existing literature focus on response of import price to exchange 
rate change as in Campa and Goldberg (2002, 2005), Dixit (1989), and Gagnon and 
Mandel (2014), to name a few. But they neglect the fact that the exporter may also change 
its export price as a response to the exchange rate change. In this paper, I add the export 
price index (XPI) as one of the price indicators, along with the consumer price index (CPI), 
the producer price index (PPI), and the import price index (MPI), in order to compare how 
changes in the exchange rate affect all of these price indices. Secondly, most literature 
neglect that the difference between appreciation and depreciation, and response of price 
indices can be asymmetric. For example, when domestic currency appreciates, the home 
exporter may lower her export price in order to keep her product as competitive as before; 
but when the domestic currency depreciates, with her export product more competitive 
already, the exporter may just keep her export price unchanged in domestic currency. 
Therefore, the asymmetry in response of price indices to exchange rate can be ascribed to 
the different level of sensitivity to appreciation and depreciation. In order to distinguish 
the difference, I use dummy variables to indicate appreciation and depreciation. The result 
affirms the existence of asymmetry in response for all the price indices I use.  
Moreover, changes in international finance environment, e.g. reform of exchange 
rate regime or major financial crisis, can also influence ERPT. Therefore, structural 
changes are expected to be found in the response series after most countries experienced 
several financial crises and some experienced exchange rate regime reform in recent 
decades. I use Bai-Perron test to detect possible structural break points in ERPT. The result 
shows that many break points are around the time of Asia financial crisis and the Great 
Recession, although the time of break point is different across countries. However, the 
direction of change in ERPT is not consistent from country to country so specific structural 
change by the break needs to be analyzed individually.  
Furthermore, because of endogeneity issues, normal OLS may be not enough to 
identify this problem fully. So, treating all the variables as endogenous variables, I use 
VAR model to estimate the response of price indices to exchange rate shock. Same as OLS 
results above, the impulse results of the VAR model also suggest that the response of price 
indices is negative, which is consistent with the prediction of theories.  
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 is the literature review. Section 1.3 
includes data description and basic model. In section 1.4, asymmetry between appreciation 
and depreciation is tested by adding dummy variables into OLS model. Section 1.5 
estimates the structural change in ERPT. Section 1.6 estimates the VAR model. And 
section 1.7 concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
In an open economy, the effect of exchange rate changes on price plays an 
important role for other macroeconomic variables, such as international trade volume, 
balance of payments, employment, etc. Therefore, research on correlation between 
exchange rate fluctuation and price inflation has been a hot topic, and literature try to study 
this problem from different angles.  
Research on correlation between exchange rate and price firstly originated from 
purchasing power parity theory (PPP). But in reality, an economy cannot meet all the 
assumptions required by PPP and many empirical works does not support the theory. 
Therefore, researchers began to find the reasons why PPP failed in real world economy, 
which led to studies of ERPT.  
In this section, I will summarize relevant research on ERPT from following aspects: 
1. Complete exchange rate pass-through. 2. Incomplete exchange rate pass-through. 3. 
Extended properties of exchange rate pass-through. 
 
2.2.1 Complete Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
Research on ERPT can be traced back to PPP which originated from Salamanca 
School in Spain during 16th century. PPP as a theory was firstly proposed by a British 
economist H. Thornton. It can be expressed as following equation:  
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃∗    (2.1) 
Here 𝑃𝑃  is domestic price level, 𝑃𝑃∗  is foreign price, and 𝑒𝑒  is exchange rate. We call it 
absolute purchasing power parity. In 1918, G. Cassel proposed the Relative PPP when 
analyzing the relationship of exchange rate fluctuations and price changes during WWI 
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for the first time. It put more emphasis on changes of exchange rate and price other than 
themselves. It can be expressed as follows:  
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑
= 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑
−
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑∗
𝑑𝑑∗
               (2.2)  
There are a lot of empirical works in PPP. Froot and Rogoff (1995) find no support 
for PPP using data from 1973, but if they extend length of the data or use cross section 
data, PPP works better. Kim (1990) tests and verifies the long-run correlation between 
exchange rates again the US dollar of several currencies and prices of those countries 
relative to the US, using a cointegration approach. 
 
2.2.2 Incomplete Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
According to methods of Campa and Goldberg (2002), there are two kinds of 
factors cause incomplete ERPT: microeconomic factors and macroeconomic factors. 
Microeconomic factors refer to industrial organization factors and economic structure 
affect the ERPT.  
Research on perspective of microeconomics usually focus on pass-through effect 
from enterprises in one country to enterprises in another country, or on certain product or 
industry. Bernhofen and Xu (2000) test the ERPT of petrochemical products imported 
from Germany and Japan. Goldberg and Verboven (2001), and Gil-Pareja (2003) 
investigate ERPT of automobile industry in different countries. Blonigen and Haynes 
(2002) investigate ERPT in price of steel exported from Canada to the US. Campa, 
Goldberg, and Gonzalez-Minguez (2005) study the ERPT to import prices in the Euro area 
from 1990 to 2005 and support the effect is different between short run and long run. In 
the short run, the ERPT is incomplete and different across countries and product categories. 
In the long run, however, the ERPT is higher and closer to 1. They detect possible 
structural change effect caused by the introduction of the euro but find no compelling 
evidence. But they predict that the ERPT to import price will decrease for manufacturing 
industries because the lagged effect of the euro introduction.  
Compared to micro-level research on ERPT, there are a larger number of studies in 
macro-level research. Sahminan (2002) use error correction model to estimate ERPT in 
Southeast Asian countries, and get the result that, for Thailand, domestic demand and 
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foreign price have significant effect on the import price, for Singapore, only the foreign 
price has significant effect on the import price, but effects of exchange rates are not 
significant for either country. Ca’Zorzi, Hahn, and Sanchez (2007) examine the ERPT to 
prices in 12 developing countries in Latin America, Asia, and Europe and find the ERPT 
into both the CPI and the MPI both are lower in those developing countries than their 
developed counterparts, especially three Asian countries. Sek and Kapsalyamoya (2008) 
emphasize the heterogeneity in ERPT of different countries, especially in four Asian 
countries − South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Shu, Su, and Chow (2008) 
and Shu and Su (2009) test the ERPT to import prices in the Chinese yuan and find 
significant effects both in the short and long run. In the short run, the ERPT of the Chinese 
yuan to prices is up to 50 percent; and in the long run, up to 60 percent. In detail, a 10 
percent appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate on average leads to a 1.1 
percent decrease in consumer prices in the short run, and 2 percent in the long run. 
However, there is a decrease in the degree of ERPT along the price chain (from upstream 
to downstream prices). Auer (2015) tests the ERPT of Chinese yuan to the US producer 
price of tradable goods and find a 1 percent appreciation in the former leads to a 0.56 
percent increase in the latter, which is the most significant among all trade partners of the 
US. Because of this strong effect, the appreciation of the Chinese yuan has a similar effect 
as the US PPI inflation on the US price. The author also finds a heterogeneity in the ERPT 
to import price across industrial sectors. Jin (2012) tests the ERPT in China and its 
relationship with monetary policy. The results indicate that a 1 percent appreciation of 
nominal effective exchange rate leads to a 0.132 percent decrease in the CPI inflation rate 
and a 0.495 percent decrease in the PPI inflation rate in the long run. However, the ERPT 
to prices is changed structurally by the exchange rate regime reform. The degree is higher 
in a fixed exchange rate regime. In Burstein and Gopinath (2013)’s study, the ERPT to 
retail prices is included. Their results indicate that the retail prices are insensitive to 
exchange rate change. They review relevant research and find a fact that higher ERPT 
always accompanies border prices due to multiple rounds of price adjustment are included 
in the estimation. Moreover, the magnitude of ERPT also depends on which currency is 
used in international trade. For countries that trade in home currency, the ERPT is 
generally higher than countries that trade in the US dollar. Borensztein and Queijo von 
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Heideken (2016) test the ERPT among the countries whose central banks are members of 
the FSD (Financial Stability and Development) network and find the magnitude of the 
ERPT is moderate and decreasing in recent decades. Exchange rate changes constitute an 
important determinant of consumer price inflation in several of those countries. 
VAR models have been used to exploit the feedback from price inflation to 
exchange rate changes as well, considering endogenous issues. An and Wang (2012) use 
VAR to estimate the ERPT in nine OECD countries and find that the ERPT is greatest for 
import prices and smallest for the CPI, and it is greater for smaller economies. Ito and Sato 
(2008) use the Cholesky decomposition to get the impulse responses and find that the 
degree of the ERPT to import prices is quite high in the crisis- hit countries, but the ERPT 
to the CPI is low, except Indonesia. 
 
2.2.3 Extended Properties of Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
Several studies report the evidence that ERPT may be asymmetric. In other words, 
the magnitude of the response of the prices to the changes in exchange rates may be 
different between home currency appreciation and depreciation. Goldberg (1995) finds the 
ERPT to consumer prices is asymmetric between depreciation and appreciation. Bussiere 
(2007) utilizes a dynamic linear model to test the ERPT to import and export prices in G7 
countries and finds significant asymmetry in some countries. However, the direction and 
degree of asymmetry are different across countries. Khundrakpam (2007)’s study supports 
the asymmetry in ERPT between depreciation and appreciation in India. Webber (2000) 
also investigates the asymmetry in the ERPT to import prices and finds that the ERPT 
effect is stronger when home currency depreciates, for 6 out of 7 Asian countries. Kadiyali 
(1997) tests ERPT in a single industry and finds very similar results to those of Webber 
(2000). 
The asymmetry in ERPT is not universally supported, however. Herzberg, 
Kapetanios, and Price (2003) test the asymmetry and nonlinearity of the ERPT of the 
British pound but fail to find any asymmetry in the effect on import price. Feinberg (1989) 
also finds a symmetric pattern of the ERPT in the US industries. The author, however, 
notes that a different result may be obtained from a long-run sample. Lawrence and Hooper 
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(1990)’s research is also based on the US trade prices, which states the ERPT is symmetric 
between depreciation and appreciation in 1980s. Olivei (2002)’s research covers 34 
industries in the United States and finds very weak or no evidence to the asymmetry. 
Athukorala (1991) finds there is no asymmetry in the ERPT of the Korean won to 
manufacturing export prices. Gil-Pareja (2000) studies the categorical export product 
prices in European countries and find no asymmetry in the response.  
Another important issue is whether the ERPT is stable or not within a certain period 
since the magnitude of ERPT is decreasing, especially in industrialized countries, in the 
1990s. Taylor (2000) explains this phenomenon as a result of contractionary monetary 
policy by testing the ERTP to import price in a circumstance of low inflation. The result 
shows that the ERPT is dampened by lower inflation rate, which also indicates a lowered 
bargaining power in pricing for the enterprises in such an economy. Campa and Goldberg 
(2002)’s research supports the hypothesis that the ERPT in the OECD countries us 
decreasing. Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) also find a decrease in the industrialized countries 
since 1980s. Takhtamanova (2008) ascribes the reduction in the real ERPT during the 
1990s to the low-inflation environment globally. The author finds a structural break during 
the 1990s for OECD countries in the relationship between real exchange rate and inflation 
rate. Olivei (2002) tests the response of import price of the US manufacturing industry to 
exchange rate change and finds the appreciation of the US dollar in 1990s has a relatively 
low effect of ERPT. Campa, Goldberg and Minguez-Gonzalez (2005) state that the 
decrease in the ERPT is different across European countries. Campa and Goldberg (2006) 
only find the decrease in ERPT to import price in 3 out of 18 countries, while Some 
countries are having insignificant change in the ERPT and some even having increase in 
the ERPT. Moreover, the decrease is not stable in some industries, such as energy, material, 
non-manufacturing ones. Cunningham and Haldane (1999) study 4 exchange-rate change 
events in the history including the depreciation of the British pound in 1992, appreciation 
of the British pound in 1996, depreciation of Swedish krona in 1992, and depreciation of 
Brazilian reais, respectively. They find those changes have very limited effect of ERPT to 
retail prices. For example, a 20 percent change (either appreciation or depreciation) in the 
British pound only changed the retail prices by 2.5 percent. the other two currencies also 
have the similar result. McCarthy (2000) compares the ERPT effect in 1983 with that in 
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1998 and the effect in 1976 with that in 1982, separately. The author employs a set of 9 
OCED countries and finds the decrease was up to 50 percent or more in the United States, 
United Kingdom, France, and Japan. Generally speaking, it is still controversial to say 
whether the ERPT is decreasing or increasing. Some studies support the decrease in the 
ERPT to import price (especially for final goods) in industrialized countries in past 
decades (e.g. Marazzi, et al., 2005; Otani, Shiratsuka, and Shirota, 2006; Frankel, Parsley 
and Wei, 2012). Some other studiens, on the contrary, support the opposite or finds no 
significant change (e.g. Ihrig, Marazzi, and Rothenberg, 2006; Hellerstein, Daly, and 
Dalton, 2006; Thomas and Marquez, 2006). 
 
2.2.4 My Contributions 
From all the existing literature, there are still many issues to be addressed:  
1. Most studies focus only on domestic prices (CPI or PPI) or import price, but ERPT 
in export price is also worthy of investigation. 
2. Most studies tend to neglect the fact there may be asymmetry in ERPT, which 
means different magnitude of response of prices between appreciation and 
depreciation. 
3. More investigations on structural changes in ERPT seems necessary. Among other 
things, there is uncertainty about whether there is a certain universal trend of 
changes in ERPT across countries. 
4. Most papers only focus on one country. We can learn more by including both 
advanced economies and emerging markets and compare their ERPT. 
I will try to address these issues in this chapter. 
 
2.3 Data Description and the Basic Model 
2.3.1 Data Description 
In this study, I estimate how exchange rate changes pass-through into four different 
price indices, the consumer price index (CPI), producer price index (PPI), import price 
index (MPI), and export price index (XPI). For the exchange rate, I use the nominal 
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effective exchange rate (NEER), which represents the trade-weighted value of the home 
currency. An increase (decrease) in NEER means appreciation (depreciation) of the 
currency. 
Global price index (GPI), GDP growth rate, and money supply (M2) are included 
as control variables. GPI is a trade-weighted average price of all commodities and assumed 
to represent the exogenously-given world price. 
I choose ten countries to compare the differences in ERPT. There are four advanced 
economies, United States, United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea, and six Asian 
emerging markets, China, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and India. 
Monthly data from 1994M1 to 2018M3 are used. The reasons why I choose this time 
period include: First, the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, which gave a tremendous 
boost in international trade as a result of lowered political and economic barriers. Second, 
a comprehensive exchange rate regime reform occurred in China in 1994, after which the 
country became a major participant in international trade. Third, some data, such as import 
and export price indices, of most countries are available only in the early 1990s. 
The data for the CPI, the PPI, the MPI, and the XPI are collected from IMF IFS 
database except for China. the CPI and the PPI data of China are collected from National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, while the MPI and the XPI data are from China’s External 
Trade Indices. Data of the MPI and the XPI for the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
India are either insufficient or nonexistent, so the results for the MPI and the XPI only 
include six countries instead of ten. GPI is collected from Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED). NEER is collected from IMF IFS database. GDP and M2 are collected from 
Bloomberg and FRED. The base year of all the price indices is 2010. All data are 
seasonally adjusted by X12-ARIMA method. 
 
2.3.2 The Basic Model 
For the basic model to determine the short-run and long-run effect of ERPT, I 
follow Campa and Goldberg (2002). Below is the regression equation I use in this chapter.  
∆𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + ∑ 𝑎𝑎−𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ∆𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽−𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ∆𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗∆𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + 𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗Δ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 +
𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗Δ𝑚𝑚2𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗    (2.3) 
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For country 𝑗𝑗, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗 is price index which can be either consumer price index (CPI), producer 
price index (PPI), import price index (MPI), or export price index (XPI). 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗 is nominal 
effective exchange rate, 𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗 is global price index (GPI), 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗 is real GDP and 𝑚𝑚2𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 is 
money supply M2. The coefficient of 𝑝𝑝0
𝑗𝑗, which is 𝑎𝑎0
𝑗𝑗, is the short-run effect of ERPT, and 
∑ 𝑎𝑎−𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=0  is the long-run effect of ERPT. 
 
2.4 Asymmetry in Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
We consider the possibility that the responses of price to exchange rate changes 
may be different between appreciation and depreciation. For example, when the domestic 
currency appreciates, the home exporter may lower her export price in home currency in 
order to keep its product as competitive as before; but when the domestic currency 
depreciates, with her export product more competitive already, the exporter is less likely 
to raise the price and may just keep her export price unchanged in domestic currency. 
Those behaviors cause different magnitudes of response of prices to changes in the 
exchange rate. See Goldberg (1995), Bussiere (2007), Khundrakpam (2007), Webber 
(2000), and Kadiyali (1997) for more discussion.  
Eq (2.3) is modified to accommodate asymmetric responses between appreciation 
and depreciation: 
∆𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + �𝑎𝑎−𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗+∆𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗+𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=0
+ �𝑎𝑎−𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗−∆𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=0
+ �𝛽𝛽−𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ∆𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
+ 
𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗∆𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗 + 𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗Δ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗Δ𝑚𝑚2𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗       (2.4) 
Δ𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗+ = �Δ𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗  𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 Δ𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 ≧ 00      𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  
Δ𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗− = �Δ𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗  𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 Δ𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 < 00      𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  
𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+ is the coefficient for appreciation and 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗− for depreciation. For the short-run impact, 
we compare 𝑎𝑎0
𝑗𝑗+ and 𝑎𝑎0
𝑗𝑗−, and for long-run, we compare ∑ 𝑎𝑎−𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗+𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=0  and ∑ 𝑎𝑎−𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗−𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=0 . I set 𝑛𝑛 =4, following Campa and Goldberg (2002).  
The estimation results from Eq (2.3) and (2.4) are listed in Table 2.1-2.4. The short-
run and long-run effects of NEER on the CPI are both significant in only two countries, 
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South Korea and Thailand. Malaysia and India are significant in the long-run effect but 
not in the short-run. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect of NEER on the CPI in those 
countries is weak. In the short run, the coefficient of the NEER on the CPI is -0.03 and -
0.07 for South Korea and Thailand, respectively, which means a 1 percent appreciation of 
the exchange rate brings about a 0.03 percent decrease in the CPI in South Korea and about 
a 0.07 percent decrease in Thailand. In the long run, the coefficient is -0.05 and -0.09 for 
those two countries. Whereas, the significance is higher for the ERPT to the PPI, the MPI, 
and the XPI, including more countries have significant coefficients of NEER and higher 
magnitude of coefficients. Nearly all countries have significant effect of NEER on the PPI 
with different coefficient across countries. For example, the coefficient of the UK is -0.13 
in the short run. This is relatively small compared to that of China, which is -0.21. The 
result in the long run effects are similar to those in the short run. For the MPI and the XPI, 
all countries with available data are significant at least at 5 percent level. Moreover, the 
magnitude of coefficients is even higher than that for the PPI. For example, the coefficient 
of the NEER in Thailand is close to 1 for both the MPI (-0.97) and the XPI (-1.03) in the 
long run, which is nearly complete ERPT. The effects of NEER in other countries are all 
very strong and the magnitude of most coefficients are larger than -0.5.  
Almost all the coefficients of NEER are negative to all price indices in the results, 
which is consistent with theory. The results are also consistent with existing empirical 
studies for China. For example, in the studies of the ERPT to the CPI, Shu, Su, and Chow 
(2008) and Shu and Su (2009) find a coefficient of NEER to be -0.11. The coefficients to 
the CPI and the PPI are -0.132 and -0.495 in Jin (2012)’s study, respectively. Auer (2015) 
also finds a larger effect on the producer price of tradable goods, which is 0.56. The long-
run effect is larger than the short-run across all countries with significant coefficient and 
all price indices. This is in line with existing studies mentioned above, as there is more 
time to adjust the prices to response to the change of the exchange rate in the long run. 
The results of asymmetric coefficients as well as the difference of the coefficients 
are also shown in Table 2.1-2.4. The coefficient of NEER is more negative when domestic 
currency appreciates in most countries. The difference is larger and more significant 
especially for the MPI and the XPI in South Korea, China, and Thailand. This is the results 
that we can expect because of different pricing strategies that an exporter chooses for 
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appreciation and depreciation. However, this kind of asymmetry seems not so significant 
either in the short run or in the long run for the US, the UK, and Japan. This implies 
exporters in those countries do not change prices asymmetrically for appreciation and 
depreciation. Figure 2.1 shows the exports to GDP ratio for these six countries, and this 
ratio of South Korea, China and Thailand is higher than that of the US and Japan. So the 
asymmetry is significant perhaps because that the country has higher exports dependency. 
The only exception is the UK which has a higher exports to GDP ratio than China, but the 
asymmetry for the MPI of the UK is also significant at 10 percent level. 
 
2.5 Structural Changes in Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
The magnitude of ERPT can be influenced by numerous factors. For example, the 
exchange rate regime of China changed during the past two decades, from a fixed exchange 
rate regime to a more flexible exchange rate regime. There were two major reforms. One 
happened in 1994, when China changes it to “A managed floating, single exchange rate 
regime based on market supply and demand”. The other happened in 2005, when China 
changes it to “A managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and 
demand with reference to a basket of currencies”. As a result, the Chinese yuan exchange 
rate against the US dollar became more flexible, especially in recent years. 
To investigate whether there are any structural changes in the ERPT, I employ the 
Bai-Perron test for all countries to find all the break point for all countries and list the 
results in Table 2.5-2.8. To check the change of the ERPT before and after a structural 
break, I select the most significant break point of every country and get the effect of the 
ERPT before and after the break. The complete results are reported in Table 2.9-2.12. For 
the CPI, the most significant break point is in 2004 for the US and the UK, 2005 for Japan, 
and 1998 for all other countries. For the PPI, it is in 2005 for the US, 2012 for the UK, 
2008 for Japan, 1998 for Korea, 1997 for China, 2013 for India, and 2008 for all other 
countries. For the MPI, it is in 2005 for the US, 2008 for the UK, 2002 for Japan, 1997 for 
China, and 1998 for Korea and Thailand. For the XPI, it is in 2005 for the US, 2008 for 
the UK, Japan and Korea, and 1998 for China and Thailand. 
Although the exact break points differ across countries and price indices, there are 
some common breaks. All Asian emerging markets experienced a structural break in the 
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response of the CPI around 1997 and 1998, which coincides with the Asia financial crisis; 
for the response of the PPI, the Great Recession of 2008-10 seemed more relevant for most 
Asian countries. For advanced economies, structural break in the responses of the CPI and 
the PPI seem less related to those two financial crises; however, their MPI appear to be 
strongly influenced by the Great Recession. This is in contrast to the existing studies that 
largely focus on exchange rate regime change as a cause of structural break in ERPPT (e.g. 
Cunningham and Haldane, 1999) or monetary policy change (e.g. Taylor, 2002). 
Overall, the point of the most significant structural change for the CPI in 7 countries 
is around the time of the Asia financial crisis; the point for the PPI in 2 countries is around 
the time of the Great Recession and 4 around the Asia financial crisis; the point for the 
MPI in 3 countries is around the Great Recession and 2 around Asia financial crisis; the 
point for the XPI in 1 country is around the Great Recession and 3 around the Asia financial 
crisis.  
The results support that the effect of ERPT is sensitive to the international 
macroeconomic environment. Financial turbulence seems to have affected the relationship 
between the exchange rate and price, but the effect depends on the magnitude of crisis and 
the level of development of countries. We note that the ERPT coefficients become larger 
after the break in some cases and smaller in some other cases. 
 
2.6 A VAR Model 
Because of the endogeneity issues, the OLS may be not adequate to identify ERPT 
correctly. In this section, I employ a VAR model for a set of five variables which consist 
of the price index (CPI, PPI, MPI, or XPI), NEER, GPI, GDP, and M2. The VAR analysis 
treats all these variables as endogenous. I use the impulse responses from this VAR model 
to see the response of price indices to a change in the exchange rate.  
Following Jin (2012), I set the order of variables in the Cholesky decomposition as 
GPI, GDP, M2, NEER, and price index (CPI, PPI, MPI, or XPI). GPI is placed first 
because it is assumed not contemporaneously affected by other four variables. GDP is 
second as it is contemporaneously affected by only GPI but not other three. NEER is 
placed last among the four as it can be reasonably assumed to contemporaneously respond 
to all the other three. The lag of the VAR model is determined by Akaike Information 
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Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Criterion (SC). In case the two criteria do not agree, the LR 
test is used. Figures 2.2-2.5 are ERPT of the four price indices to NEER. 
For ease of comparison, I list the maximum response from all figures in Table 2.13 
and 2.14. The break points are the same as the most significant ones in the OLS model. 
Almost all responses exhibit negative price responses to a currency appreciation as 
expected. However, most of those maximum responses are very small and decline fast 
after several periods. The maximum periods I use here is 10, and almost all the responses 
are near zero in all these figures after 10 periods. The estimates of ERPT estimated by 
VAR models are smaller than those by the OLS model. Some current studies such as Jin 
(2012) show similar findings. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I estimate the extent of ERPT for ten countries with four different 
price indices with monthly data for the 1991M1 to 2018M3 period. I found that (i) ERPT 
is lowest for the CPI and largest for the MPI and the XPI, (ii) the long-run effects are 
usually larger than the short-run effects, (iii) ERPT is most significantly asymmetric for 
Korea, China and Thailand, where the export dependency ratio is higher than others. The 
asymmetry is strongest with the MPI and the XPI, which indicates that exporters are more 
likely to lower the export prices when the domestic currency appreciates than they raise 
when it depreciates. (iv) As for the structure changes, we find most significant break points 
occurred around the Great Recession and the Asia financial crisis. (v) The ERPT 
coefficients obtained from the VAR models are smaller than those from OLS, perhaps 
reflecting the endogeneity of the exchange rate-price relationships. 
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Table 2.1  The Effect of NEER on CPI 
Country SR SR with asymmetry LR LR with asymmetry 
App Dep Diff App Dep Diff 
US 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.05 
UK -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.03 
Japan -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 -0.05 
Korea -0.03*** 0.02** 0.05** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.13*** -0.02** -0.11*** 
China -0.05 -0.01* 0.10* -0.11*** 0.07 0.09** 0.03* 0.06** 
Thailand -0.07*** 0.02*** -0.09*** 0.11*** -0.09*** 0.11*** -0.19*** 0.30*** 
Philippines 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.05 
Malaysia 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.11** 0.13** 0.05* 0.08*** 
Indonesia 0.00 0.07 -0.05 0.12 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.05 
India -0.03 -0.05* -0.01 -0.04* -0.05* 0.06* -0.12* 0.18** 
 
 
  
  
 
20 
Table 2.2  The Effect of NEER on PPI 
Country SR SR with asymmetry LR LR with asymmetry 
App Dep Diff App Dep Diff 
US -0.11 -0.13 -0.09 -0.04 -0.24** -0.29 -0.22 -0.07 
UK -0.13*** -0.18*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.25** -0.19** -0.38** 0.19*** 
Japan -0.06** -0.03 -0.07 0.04 0.13*** -0.11 -0.19 0.08 
Korea -0.07*** -0.03*** -0.10*** 0.07*** 0.17*** -0.07** -0.19*** 0.12*** 
China -0.21*** -0.21 -0.21 0.00 -0.30 -0.11* -0.40* 0.29*** 
Thailand -0.15*** -0.10*** -0.21*** 0.11*** -0.15*** -0.18*** -0.05** -0.13*** 
Philippines -0.05* -0.07 -0.07 0.00 -0.43*** -0.45*** -0.40*** -0.05** 
Malaysia -0.06*** -0.11*** -0.02*** -0.09*** -0.19* -0.21* -0.18* -0.03** 
Indonesia -0.19*** -0.27*** -0.10*** -0.17*** -0.29*** -0.50* -0.18** -0.32*** 
India -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.13** 0.03** 
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Table 2.3  The Effect of NEER on MPI 
Country SR SR with asymmetry LR LR with asymmetry 
App Dep Diff App Dep Diff 
US -0.56** -0.61** -0.54** -0.07 -0.81*** -0.76** -0.88** -0.08 
UK -0.25*** -0.28*** -0.23*** -0.05* -0.58*** -0.65*** -0.52*** -0.13* 
Japan -0.39*** -0.37** -0.40** 0.03 -0.76*** -0.80** -0.72** -0.08 
Korea -0.52*** -0.73*** -0.43*** -0.30*** -0.87*** -0.98*** -0.79*** -0.19** 
China -0.69** -0.79** -0.55** -0.24*** -0.75** -0.95** -0.67** -0.28*** 
Thailand -0.58** -0.65** -0.49** -0.15** -0.97** -1.12** -0.82** -0.30*** 
 
  
  
 
22 
Table 2.4  The Effect of NEER on XPI 
Country SR SR with asymmetry LR LR with asymmetry 
App Dep Diff App Dep Diff 
US -0.61*** -0.66** -0.59*** -0.07* -0.78*** -0.76*** -0.80** 0.04 
UK -0.27*** -0.25** -0.31*** 0.08 -0.58*** -0.60*** -0.57*** -0.03 
Japan -0.46*** -0.50*** -0.43*** -0.07 -0.71*** -0.79*** -0.69** -0.10* 
Korea -0.53*** -0.76*** -0.42*** -0.34*** -0.89*** -1.03*** -0.82*** -0.21*** 
China -0.41** -0.56** -0.35** -0.21*** -0.73** -0.93** -0.62** -0.31*** 
Thailand -0.75*** -0.91*** -0.65*** -0.26*** -1.03*** -1.23*** -0.90*** -0.33*** 
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Table 2.5  Break Points (CPI) 
Country Break points 
US 1995M02 2001M06 2004M06 2011M07 2016M03 
UK 1996M05 2003M08 2005M04 2013M05 2016M05 
Japan 2001M06 2005M04 2011M05 2014M01 2017M09 
Korea 1998M07 2001M01 2005M09 2008M01 2015M08 
China 1998M01 2005M07 2008M03 2011M01 2016M01 
Thailand 1995M06 1999M01 2003M05 2007M10 2013M09 
Philippines 1998M07 2002M09 2006M10 2010M09 2015M05 
Malaysia 1998M08 2003M06 2007M01 2010M03 2015M08 
Indonesia 1996M02 1999M05 2001M09 2010M08 2014M01 
India 1998M12 2000M05 2008M01 2013M02 2017M01 
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Table 2.6  Break Points (PPI) 
Country Break points 
US 1994M11 2001M01 2005M12 2012M01 2015M11 
UK 1995M11 2003M01 2005M10 2012M07 2015M10 
Japan 2001M02 2005M05 2008M09 2014M02 2017M01 
Korea 1998M02 2001M07 2005M02 2007M10 2016M01 
China 1997M08 2005M01 2007M12 2011M08 2016M09 
Thailand 1995M04 1999M08 2003M01 2008M11 2013M09 
Philippines 1998M05 2002M06 2006M06 2008M09 2015M09 
Malaysia 1999M01 2003M09 2006M12 2008M05 2015M09 
Indonesia 1996M06 1999M05 2001M08 2008M09 2013M11 
India 1998M12 2000M02 2008M06 2013M07 2017M06 
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Table 2.7  Break Points (MPI) 
Country Break points 
US 1994M10 2001M09 2005M11 2011M06 2016M01 
UK 1996M08 2004M04 2008M09 2013M11 2016M01 
Japan 2002M05 2004M09 2011M07 2014M03 2017M08 
Korea 1998M05 2001M01 2006M05 2008M09 2015M02 
China 1997M05 2005M12 2007M12 2010M09 2016M05 
Thailand 1995M04 1998M01 2003M09 2007M09 2013M06 
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Table 2.8  Break Points (XPI) 
Country Break points 
US 1995M08 2000M12 2005M05 2011M08 2016M06 
UK 1996M04 2003M09 2008M09 2012M11 2016M10 
Japan 2001M12 2004M09 2008M11 2013M12 2017M12 
Korea 1998M01 2001M09 2005M07 2008M10 2015M05 
China 1998M12 2004M12 2008M03 2010M07 2015M08 
Thailand 1998M01 1999M03 2003M05 2008M06 2013M11 
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Table 2.9  Structural Break (CPI) 
Country Break point Before break After break 
SR LR SR LR 
US 2004M06 0.03 -0.05 0.07 -0.02 
UK 2004M05 -0.06 0.03 0.03 0.01 
Japan 2005M04 -0.05 -0.07 0.03 -0.09 
Korea 1998M07 -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.02** -0.06*** 
China 1998M01 -0.04*** 0.08 -0.02 0.05 
Thailand 1999M01 -0.02 -0.10*** -0.06** -0.07*** 
Philippines 1998M07 0.03* 0.01 -0.01 0.05 
Malaysia 1998M08 -0.04 0.13** 0.02 0.08** 
Indonesia 1999M05 0.03 -0.03 -0.02** -0.01 
India 1998M12 0.03 -0.03 -0.06** -0.06 
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Table 2.10  Structural Break (PPI) 
Country Break point Before break After break 
SR LR SR LR 
US 2005M12 -0.13 -0.21** -0.09 -0.31** 
UK 2012M07 -0.17*** -0.31** -0.11** -0.19* 
Japan 2008M09 -0.02 0.11*** -0.08* 0.19* 
Korea 1998M02 -0.11*** 0.21** -0.05*** 0.12* 
China 1997M08 -0.19*** -0.51 -0.25*** -0.2 
Thailand 2008M11 -0.17*** -0.11** -0.11** -0.19*** 
Philippines 2008M09 -0.06 -0.55*** -0.03* -0.23*** 
Malaysia 2008M05 -0.08*** -0.11 -0.04*** -0.21** 
Indonesia 2008M09 -0.11*** -0.34*** -0.23*** -0.25** 
India 2013M07 -0.01*** -0.09** -0.07*** -0.13*** 
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Table 2.11  Structural Break (MPI) 
Country Break point Before break After break 
SR LR SR LR 
US 2005M11 -0.49** -0.79*** -0.60** -0.84*** 
UK 2008M09 -0.30*** -0.51*** -0.19*** -0.63*** 
Japan 2002M05 -0.30*** -0.80*** -0.45*** -0.72*** 
Korea 1998M05 -0.51*** -0.80** -0.53*** -0.94*** 
China 1997M05 -0.78** -0.79*** -0.60*** -0.70** 
Thailand 1998M01 -0.50*** -0.99** -0.69** -0.92*** 
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Table 2.12  Structural Break (XPI) 
Country Break point Before break After break 
SR LR SR LR 
US 2005M05 -0.59*** -0.72*** -0.64** -0.83*** 
UK 2008M09 -0.29*** -0.62*** -0.23*** -0.55*** 
Japan 2008M11 -0.50** -0.85*** -0.42*** -0.67** 
Korea 2008M10 -0.49*** -0.72** -0.60*** -0.95*** 
China 1998M12 -0.31*** -0.56** -0.50** -0.84** 
Thailand 1998M01 -0.89*** -1.11*** -0.67*** -0.92** 
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Table 2.13  Maximum Response (%) 
Country CPI PPI MPI XPI 
US -0.032 -0.149 -0.206 -0.138 
UK -0.018 -0.060 -0.743 -0.867 
Japan -0.020 -0.075 -1.540 -1.407 
Korea -0.120 -0.322 -1.773 -2.005 
China -0.009 -0.112 -0.236 -0.108 
Thailand -0.081 -0.421 -1.987 -2.011 
Philippines -0.013 -0.380 NA NA 
Malaysia -0.058 -0.165 NA NA 
Indonesia -0.048 -0.291 NA NA 
India -0.070 -0.119 NA NA 
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Table 2.14  Maximum Response (%): Structural Break 
Country CPI PPI MPI XPI 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After 
US -0.041 -0.024 -0.118 -0.181 -0.200 -0.250 -0.124 -0.164 
UK -0.010 -0.020 -0.088 -0.047 -0.727 -0.764 -0.906 -0.854 
Japan -0.020 -0.027 -0.086 -0.033 -1.985 -1.495 -1.614 -0.932 
Korea -0.111 -0.129 -0.279 -0.361 -1.722 -1.806 -1.628 -2.023 
China -0.008 -0.009 -0.152 -0.087 -0.246 -0.231 -0.061 -0.125 
Thailand -0.089 -0.074 -0.411 -0.424 -2.220 -1.490 -2.326 -1.738 
Philippines -0.021 -0.006 -0.393 -0.380 NA NA NA NA 
Malaysia -0.056 -0.063 -0.148 -0.198 NA NA NA NA 
Indonesia -0.056 -0.038 -0.311 -0.258 NA NA NA NA 
India -0.068 -0.078 -0.094 -0.140 NA NA NA NA 
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Figure 2.1  Exports (% of GDP) 
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Figure 2.2  Responses of CPI to NEER 
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Figure 2.3  Responses of PPI to NEER 
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Figure 2.4  Responses of MPI to NEER 
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Figure 2.5  Responses of XPI to NEER 
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CHAPTER 3. EXCHANGE RATE REGIME IN CHINA 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the reform of China’s exchange rate regime in 2005, the Chinese yuan 
exchange rate and China’s exchange rate policy have been the focus of literature and 
practice. This is the biggest change of the yuan exchange rate policy since the previous 
reform in 1994, so we can call this reform as “the Second Exchange Reform”. There has 
been numerous heated debates and arguments about whether the Chinese yuan should 
appreciate or not, and whether China manipulates its currency exchange rate. During the 
past thirteen years of the reform since 2005, China’s foreign reserves increased from about 
700 billion US dollars in the beginning of the reform to the peak of about 4 trillion dollars 
in 2014, before declining to a level that is a bit more than 3 trillion dollars in recent years.1 
Along with the huge accumulation of international reserves comes the pressure 
from the US government to appreciate the yuan and to float the currency, which is based 
on the hypothesis that the Chinese government keeps the yuan undervalued to keep the 
export products competitive in the world market. The Chinese government has been trying 
to reform the exchange rate regime at its own pace as well as at the request of the US 
government. 
Despite reforms and changes, the official exchange rate regime in China still 
remains similar to what it was claimed at the beginning of the reform, viz. “a managed 
floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with reference to a 
basket of currencies”.2 Nevertheless, the component currencies of the basket and their 
corresponding weights are never publicly revealed. 3  Thus we need to find a way to 
determine the currency basket. Moreover, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) does not 
say the yuan exchange rate is determined by, but “with reference to”, a basket. This seems 
                                                 
1 See Figure 3.1 for the historical data of China’s foreign reserve.  
2 The definition of China’s exchange rate regime can be found in Xiaochuan Zhou’s, the former 
governor of China’s central bank, speech: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20070610031235/http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6500&ID=82 
3 Some studies such as Frank and Wei (2008) and Cui (2012, 2014) use a basket of eleven 
currencies based on the speech in 2005 by Xiaochuan Zhou. But what he meant was that the eleven 
countries were the most important trade partners of China, so currencies of those countries were the major 
considerations in the determination of the basket. However, that does not necessarily mean currencies in the 
basket are the same as the eleven currencies. 
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to imply that the Chinese central bank may not be pegged to the basket, but instead 
employs a crawling peg to the US dollar instead. Just when most other currencies in the 
basket appreciate against the US dollar, China will adjust the yuan to appreciate against 
the US dollar as well. PBOC also says that it is “a managed floating regime based on 
market supply and demand”. So, whenever there is excessive supply or demand of the US 
dollar, the central bank may buy or sell the US dollar to intervene in the market. The 
purpose of this paper is to estimate China’s de facto exchange rate policy and investigate 
the composition and weights in PBOC’s currency basket. 
Frankel and Wei (1994) introduce a basic regression model to estimate the weights 
of currencies in a basket. This popular method has been employed to investigate the 
currency basket of the Chinese yuan in empirical studies by Shah, Zeileis and Patnaik 
(2005) and Cui (2012, 2014). Frankel and Wei (2008) have upgraded their model to a so-
called new technique model by adding the exchange market pressure (EMP) variable as a 
regressor, compared to the old technique basic model. In most of those literature, they find 
the Chinese yuan is still pegged to the US dollar, but not to a currency basket, although 
the weight of the US dollar may have declined a bit.  
However, existing studies are relatively old, so they cannot reflect the newest 
change of China’s exchange rate regime. In fact, China has announced several significant 
exchange rate policy changes and move the reform forward in most recent years. For 
example, 
(i) At the end of 2005, China introduce the market maker system into its 
interbank foreign exchange market 
(ii) The daily variation range of the Chinese yuan against the US dollar has been 
widened for several times since the reform. At the beginning, the maximum 
allowed daily variation was ±0.3 percent, it was widened to ±0.5 percent on 
May 21, 2007, to ±1 percent on April 16, 2012, and then to ±2 percent on 
March 17, 2014. 
(iii) China has signed currency swap agreements with countries such as the 
Eurozone, Japan, South Korea, etc., for internationalization of the yuan, 
since 2014. 
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(iv) The PBOC claimed to have improved the determination of the quoted price 
of the central parity exchange rate on August 11, 2015. The new policy 
requires market makers needs to provide its quoted price to the China 
Foreign Exchange Trading System before market opening, with reference 
to last closing price, taking both supply and demand and variations of major 
international currencies into consideration. 
(v) The yuan has been added to the Special Drawing Right (SDR) basket 
October 1, 2016. It currently consists of five currencies: the US dollar, the 
Euro, the Chinese yuan, the Japanese yen and the British pound. 
(vi) The trend appreciation of the yuan seems to have slowed or even reversed 
in the past few years.  
Thus it will be interesting to investigate the de facto exchange rate regime in China 
with the most recent data, especially with the Frankel and Wei’s (2008) new technique. 
In this chapter, both the old basic model and the new model with the EMP variable 
are used to investigate the Chinese yuan exchange rate, to find China’s de facto exchange 
rate regime. A VAR model is employed also to check the robustness of the results while 
avoiding the potential endogeneity biases. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 is the literature review. Section 3 
describes the history of China’s exchange rate regime reforms and how the exchange 
basket of the Chinese yuan is determined in this chapter. Section 4 describes the main 
empirical models and data that will be used in this chapter. In section 5, the results are 
analyzed, and those results show that how China’s exchange rate regime has changed. In 
section 6, the results are compared to that of a VAR model. Section 7 discusses more about 
the results and compares them with other literature. And section 8 concludes. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Currency Basket 
Regarding a currency basket, the most important things are the composition of the 
currencies in the basket and the weight of each currency. If a country claims its currency 
is pegged to a currency basket and the component currencies are revealed, it will be much 
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easier to estimate the weights of each currencies. But usually, neither the component 
currencies nor the weights are revealed by the country in real world, so we do not know 
whether this currency is really pegged to a basket or not. Frankel (1993) proposes a simple 
OLS regression model to estimate weights of a currency basket, which uses change in the 
value of the currency to be investigated as dependent variable and change in the value of 
currencies in the basket as regressors. This can be expressed as the following equation. 
∆𝑒𝑒0𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐 + �𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖∆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝜀 
First, the numeraire used to measure the value of the currencies is very important, 
and there are different choices of numeraires in the literature. Frankel (1993) uses 
purchasing power of a basket of domestic consumer goods as the numeraire, when 
introduces his OLS regression method. There are papers that select a kind of currency as 
the numeraire, such as the SDR or a remote currency. Frankel and Wei (1995, 2008), 
Frankel and Xie (2010), and Cui (2012, 2014) use the SDR. Frankel and Wei (1994), Ohno 
(1999), and Eichengreen (2007) use the Swiss franc. Yamazaki (2006) use the Canadian 
dollar. Frankel, Schmukler and Servén (2000) use a basket of five major currencies 
weighted by GDP.  
There are papers that use the same method to estimate the basket weights for the 
Chinese yuan. Frankel and Wei (1994) investigates several Asian currencies, including the 
Chinese yuan, using the US dollar and the Japanese yen as main component currencies of 
the basket and the Swiss franc as the numeraire. They find that the Chinese yuan is highly 
correlated to the US dollar during 1979 to 1992. Ohno (1999) finds that the Chinese yuan 
is pegged to the US dollar but with occasional adjustment. Shah, Zeileis and Patnaik (2005) 
study the Chinese yuan with data after July 21, 2005, shortly after the reform was 
announced, and find that China appears to have shifted from a fixed exchange rate regime 
to a US dollar peg with a standard error of the weight of roughly 0.03 and an 𝑅𝑅2 of 99.79 
percent which is a highly limited extent of currency flexibility. They fail to find evidence 
of a basket peg or a gradual evolution of the exchange rate regime in China. Eichengreen 
(2007) finds that the weight of the US dollar to be around 90 percent with daily data from 
July 2005 to March 2006. This implies that the yuan is still pegged the dollar. Yamazaki 
(2006) finds that the weights of the Euro, the Japanese yen and the Korean won have 
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increased in the currency basket although the increases are limited. Cui (2012, 2014) uses 
a basket of eleven currencies and finds the weight of the US dollar declined in the later 
sub-periods after the reform while the weights of other currencies still remain insignificant. 
There are also other papers that use alternative models to estimate China’s 
exchange rate regime. Frankel and Wei (2008) propose a new method by adding the EMP 
variable to the original model, and find the Chinese yuan has become more flexible as 
indicated by the increase in the coefficient estimate of the EMP. However, the decline in 
the weight of the dollar and the increase in the weight of other currencies are not significant. 
Moosa (2008) compares a discretionary crawling peg model to the currency basket model 
and finds that the Chinese yuan is crawling pegged to the US dollar instead of a currency 
basket. 
 
3.2.2 Exchange Market Pressure 
The concept of exchange market pressure (EMP) is first introduced by Girton and 
Roper (1977), as sum of the change of the currency itself and the change of foreign reserve 
divided by money base, and it is derived from a monetary model. Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz (1995) think macroeconomic structural model has limited explanatory on 
exchange rate in short or middle-run. They propose a simplified way to derive the EMP, 
which is independent of macroeconomic models, define the EMP as a weighted sum of 
changes of exchange rate, foreign reserve and interest rate, and the weights are 
unstructured. Weymark (1995) points out that, if there is an expectation for intervention 
policy, the EMP will measure the excessive demand of the currency in international market, 
and it should be defined as a weighted average of the change of foreign reserve and 
exchange rate. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), 
Aizenman, Lee and Sushko (2012), and Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2016) have similar 
definitions of the EMP, with different choices of weights. Klaassen and Jager (2011) add 
counterfactual interest to the EMP and claim that a natural proxy for it is the interest rate 
under Taylor rule. Patnaik, Felman and Shah (2017) use empirical estimation results of 
exchange rate elasticity as weights in the EMP. Goldberg and Krogstrup (2018) use a new 
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model to form the EMP, which is relying on balance of payments equilibrium conditions 
and international asset portfolio considerations based on economic theory. 
Frankel and Wei (2008) add the EMP variable to the model for the first time and 
uses it to show the flexibility of the investigated currency itself. The new equation is as 
follows. 
∆𝑒𝑒0𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐 + �𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖∆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
+ 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀 
The bigger the coefficient of the EMP is, the more flexible the currency is. Thus 
the coefficient should be close to 1 under free floating and to 0 under a fixed exchange 
rate. 
 
3.2.3 My Contributions 
Main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows. 
1. There were several important changes in recent years that have led to significant 
changes in the de facto exchange rate regime in China. They have not been 
incorporated in the existing studies. This would be among the most up-to-date 
estimations of China’s exchange rate regime. 
2. It is important to incorporate the EMP variable to capture the extent of exchange 
rate flexibility of the Chinese yuan to find the evidence that China has been 
moving toward a floating exchange rate. 
3. The component currencies of the basket will be determined by a set of criteria, 
based on free floaters, GDP and major trade partners with China, but not by 
subjective choice. 
4. I employ a VAR model as well as the OLS to address the potential endogeneity 
biases. 
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3.3 A Brief Introduction of China’s Exchange Rate Regime 
3.3.1 A Brief History of Reforms 
Figure 3.2 is the historical Chinese yuan exchange rate against the US dollar from 
1981 to 2018, during which two major reforms of the yuan exchange rate regime happened. 
Before 1994, when it was the initial stage of China’s “reform and opening-up”, China’s 
exchange rate regime was a dual exchange rates regime. There was an official exchange 
rate, but almost no one can get it and there were not much international trades for China 
during that time. The official exchange rate had depreciated by 80 percent until 1994. 
Other than the official exchange rate, there was also the “black market”, in which the price 
of the US dollar was much higher. In this context, the first important reform of China’s 
exchange rate regime took place in 1994.  
The first action of the 1994 reform was to change from dual exchange rates regime 
to a single one. Because the US dollar was much more expensive in the black market than 
the official rate, there was a sharp depreciation against the US dollar, from 5.8 to 8.7 with 
the unification of the dual exchange rates. Another important action was the mandatory 
exchange settlement. It is a mandatory requirement that any individual or business must 
sell foreign exchange to designated banks, and those banks must sell foreign exchange in 
the market. After all positions are cleared, China’s central bank will always buy all the 
excessive supply of foreign exchange, as China’s foreign reserve. After this sharp 
depreciation, China’s exports began to grow rapidly, and the economy was booming as it 
deepened the “reform and opening-up”. Meanwhile China began to have a surplus in 
international balance of payments, and foreign reserves grew significantly, from about 50 
billion US dollars in 1994 to almost 4 trillion US dollars in 2014.4 The official language 
to describe China’s exchange rate regime during that time was “A managed floating, single 
exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand”. The key word “single” means 
the elimination of dual exchange rates. However, the Chinese yuan was just almost pegged 
to the US dollar, not based on market. Because of the mandatory exchange settlement, 
China’s central bank would always buy the excessive US dollar in the market at a fixed 
                                                 
4 See Figure 3.1 
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rate, no matter how much surplus there was in international balance of payments. 
Therefore, the exchange rate of the Chinese yuan against the US dollar was always around 
8.2 and the yuan was pegged to the dollar successfully, until the other major reform took 
place in 2005.  
On July 21, 2005, China’s central bank announced the reform that China’s 
exchange rate regime would change to “A managed floating exchange rate regime based 
on market supply and demand with reference to a basket of currencies”. The yuan ended 
its fixed exchange rate against the dollar finally, although we were not sure whether it was 
really pegged to a currency basket. Just several months after the announcement, China 
introduce the market maker system into its interbank foreign exchange market, for better 
market-oriented pricing of the yuan. As shown in Figure 3.3, the Chinese yuan appreciated 
against the US dollar gradually from the beginning of the reform until June 2008 in the 
middle of the Global Finance Crisis. The yuan exchange rate was then repegged to the 
dollar. On June 19, 2010, the PBOC announced the restart of the reform and it would 
increase the flexibility of exchange rate movement. The yuan resumed the trend 
appreciation against the dollar.  
The trend appreciation ended in January 2014, and the exchange rate volatility 
increased sharply afterwards. The daily variation range of the Chinese yuan against the US 
dollar has widened several times since the 2005 reform. At the beginning, the maximum 
allowed daily variation was ±0.3 percent, it was widened to ±0.5 percent on May 21, 2007, 
to ±1 percent on April 16, 2012, and then to ±2 percent on March 17, 2014. On August 11, 
2015, China’s central bank announced it would improve the determination of the quoted 
price of the yuan central parity rate. From that day on, every market maker needs to provide 
its quoted price to the China Foreign Exchange Trading System before market opening, 
with reference to last closing price, taking both supply and demand and variations of major 
international currencies into consideration. On October 1, 2016, the Chinese yuan was 
added to the SDR basket, which means a big step for the internationalization of the yuan. 
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3.3.2 How to Choose the Currency Basket 
The first step in the estimation of a country’s de facto exchange rate regime is to 
determine the basket of currencies the country is supposed to target (or peg). Most studies 
simply choose either major currencies or the eleven currencies mentioned in Xiaochuan 
Zhou’s speech. I choose currencies based on three criteria as follows.  
1. Free floating currencies according to Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions 2016.5 
2. Countries in the Top 20 list of GDP by PPP.6 
3. Major trade partners defined by China customs in 2017.7 
Seven currencies satisfy all three criteria: the US dollar (USD), the Euro (EUR), 
the British pound (GBP), the Japanese yen (JPY), the Canadian dollar (CAD), the 
Australian dollar (AUD) and the Russian ruble (RUB). I also tried other combinations of 
basket such as floating currencies. But the seven-currency basket works best as the weights 
are most significant. 
 
3.4 The Model and Data Description 
3.4.1 The Basic Model 
I follow Frankel and Wei’s (2008) method to estimate the de facto foreign exchange 
basket weights for the Chinese yuan. I start with the basic OLS model, in which the first 
difference of the yuan exchange rate is regressed on the first difference of exchange rates 
of currencies in the basket as follows:  
∆𝑒𝑒0𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖∆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝜀  (3.1)  
where 𝑒𝑒0𝑡𝑡 is the yuan exchange rate and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the exchange rate of currency 𝑔𝑔 in the basket 
and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 is the corresponding weight.  
                                                 
5 These countries with free floating currencies are Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, 
Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, United Kingdom, Somalia, United States, and EMU. Source: 
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/AREAER/AREAER_2016_Overview.ashx 
6 See Table 3.1 
7 See Table 3.2 
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For the numeraire I use the SDR as in Frankel and Wei (2008). (This means that all 
exchange rates are defined in terms of SDR per unit of currency.) Because we assume that 
the Chinese yuan pegs to the currency basket, we want the sum of weights equals to 1 as 
follow.  
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 = 1  (3.2)  
Subtracting currency 𝑛𝑛 from both sides of Eq (3.1), we can get Eq (3.3).  
∆𝑒𝑒0𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛−1𝑖𝑖=1 (∆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) + 𝜀𝜀  (3.3)  
Eq (3.3) is estimated to obtain the weights on currency 1 to currency 𝑛𝑛 − 1, and the weight 
of currency 𝑛𝑛 is 1 − ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛−1𝑖𝑖=1 . I choose the Canadian Dollar as the currency 𝑛𝑛, since it 
seems the least important currency for China’s foreign exchange basket I selected. With 
this basic model, we can find the de facto weights on currencies in the basket if the basket 
is correctly identified and the yuan is pegged to the basket as China claims. 
 
3.4.2 Rolling Regression 
As discussed in the previous section, it seems reasonable to expect that China’s 
exchange rate regime would have changed over time with its gradual reform and a number 
of significant events in recent years. In order to see how the basket weights change over 
the whole period, I first estimate rolling three-month regressions.  
The rolling regressions are described as follows. I do regression on the 1st, 2nd, 
and 3rd month to get the weights of the first three months, then I do regression on the 2nd, 
3rd, and 4th month to get the weights of the second three months, and I repeat this process. 
Through this way, I can get the continuous changes of basket weights and show the gradual 
reforms of China’s exchange rate regime. 
 
3.4.3 Exchange Market Pressure 
Frankel and Wei (2008) add the EMP as an additional variable to the regression 
equation in their “new technique”. So Eq (3.3) can be modified to the following one. 
∆𝑒𝑒0𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛−1𝑖𝑖=1 (∆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀          (3.4) 
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The EMP variable is first introduced by Girton and Roper (1977) and defined as 
the sum of foreign reserve variation and exchange rate variation. Adding the variable to 
the regression allows the estimation of exchange rate flexibility of the yuan in addition to 
the basket weights. If the coefficient is zero, the Chinese yuan is perfectly pegged to the 
currency basket. If it is one, the Chinese yuan is purely free-floating. In literature, there 
are different definitions of EMP. In this chapter, the EMP will be derived using the 
following procedure.  
Following both Girton and Roper (1977), and Klaassen and Jager (2011), I consider 
the following monetary model,  
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  (3.5)  
where 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 is the money base issued by the central bank, 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 is foreign reserves, and 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 is 
domestic credit. 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡, and 𝑔𝑔 are price level, real income and interest rate respectively. 
Taking natural log on both sides on Eq (3.5), we obtain 
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = log(𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡  (3.6)  
where 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 and 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 are log of money base, price level and real income respectively. Eq 
(3.6) is the money market equilibrium condition. Variables with asterisk are foreign 
variables. Assuming purchasing power parity (PPP),  
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  (3.7) 
where 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 is the exchange rate at time 𝑜𝑜, defined as foreign currency price of one unit of 
domestic currency price, substituting 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 and 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ from Eq (3.6) into Eq (3.7), we obtain the 
following equation. 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡∗) − 𝛼𝛼(𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 − 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡∗)  (3.8) 
Taking first difference of Eq (3.8), we obtain 
∆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = ∆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡∗ − ∆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽(∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡∗) − 𝛼𝛼(∆𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡∗)  (3.9) 
where ∆ is the first difference operator. From the definition of 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, we know that.  
∆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 ≈ ∆𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 = ∆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 + ∆𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1  (3.10) 
Substituting Eq (3.10) into Eq (3.9), and subtracting (∆𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡∗) from both sides of the 
equation, we obtain the following definition of EMP I use in the following empirical study: 
∆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + ∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 − ∆(𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 − 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡∗) = − ∆𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 + ∆𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝛽𝛽(∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡∗) − 
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(1 + 𝛼𝛼)∆(𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 − 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡∗)  (3.11) 
From the right-hand side of this equation, we can see the EMP is negatively related with 
change of domestic credit and positively correlated with change of foreign money base, 
which means the domestic currency depreciates when there is expansion of domestic credit 
or appreciates when there is expansion of foreign money base. The EMP is also positively 
related to the difference of domestic and foreign growth rates of income. The EMP is also 
negatively related with change of the interest rate differential. 
According to the form of the EMP defined as the left-hand side of Eq (3.11), the 
EMP consists of volatility of the exchange rate, foreign reserves and interest rate 
differential with equal weights. However, the scale of volatilities of the three variables can 
be quite different. Following the conventional approach, we adjust the weights of the three 
variables by a method called precision weights to make their scales similar as follows: 
𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = ∆𝑒𝑒0𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆 Δ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝛾𝛾Δ(𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 − 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡∗)  (3.12) 
where 𝜆𝜆 = 𝜎𝜎(Δ𝑠𝑠0𝑡𝑡)
𝜎𝜎( Δ𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1
), and 𝛾𝛾 = 𝜎𝜎(Δ𝑠𝑠0𝑡𝑡)𝜎𝜎(Δ(𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗)). 
 
3.4.4 Data Description 
According to the models, the data used in this chapter will be the Chinese yuan 
exchange rate and exchange rates of all the currencies in the basket. Because I will use the 
SDR as numeraire, those exchange rates are defined as the SDR price of one unit of 
currency. All exchange rates data are daily data and collected from the official website of 
IMF. The data range is from August 2005, when the reform of China’s exchange rate 
regime began, to February 2018.  
For the EMP, monthly data for foreign reserves and monetary base are collected 
from the official website of China’s central bank. The Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate 
(SHIBOR) is will be used as China’s domestic interest rate. The foreign interest rate is a 
weighted average of the London Interbank Offered Rates (LIBORs) of USD, EUR, GBP 
and JPY, with weights of 0.65, 0.2, 0.075 and 0.075, respectively, according to the 
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composition of China’s and world’s foreign reserves.8 All interest rates are 1-month rates. 
The data range is from October 2006, when the SHIBOR was established, to February 
2018.  
In summary, for the basic model, daily data from August 2005 to February 2018 
are used, and for the model with the EMP, monthly data from October 2006 to February 
2018 are used. 
 
3.5 Empirical Results 
To avoid spurious regression, I need to test whether all the time series are stationary 
before the regressions I will do in this chapter. I use Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test 
to check the stationarity and find that the first difference of all exchange rates and the EMP 
variable are stationary.  
 
3.5.1 The Evolution of Basket Weights 
For the basic model, I fist check the stability of the weights on the basket currencies. 
Using daily data makes rolling regressions with 3-month window a feasible choice. The 
results are reported in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.4. 
Figure 3.4 shows wide fluctuations in the estimated weights fluctuate a lot during 
the whole sample period. Based on incidents marked in Figure 3.4, we can roughly divide 
the whole sample period into several sub-periods. 
The first sub-period is from August 2005 to about November 2008, during which, 
the weight of the US dollar fluctuates below 1 and above 0.8 for most of the time. 
Whenever it falls below 0.8, the Russian ruble always gets some weight during this period. 
So, we can say the Russian ruble may be an important reference currency in China’s 
foreign exchange basket during this period. What is also interesting that we can find during 
this period, is that the weight of the US dollar is above one for once and the weights of the 
Euro and the British pound have negative signs although not significantly different from 
                                                 
8 The composition of China’s foreign reserves is not publicly revealed, but there are estimates that 
the US dollar accounts for 60 percent to 70 percent. The composition of world’s foreign reserves can be 
found at IMF’ website: http://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4 
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zero. That could be because of multicollinearity. Because currencies like the Euro and the 
British pound are highly correlated with each other, their weights cannot be identified 
correctly if there is multicollinearity. The negative weights cancel out the positive weights.  
The second sub-period is from about November 2008 to about March 2010, during 
which, the weight of the US dollar is almost 1 and the weights of other currencies are 
almost 0. During this period, China paused the reform of China’s foreign exchange regime, 
so the Chinese yuan is completely pegged to the US dollar again. The third sub-period, 
which is from about March 2010 to about October 2015, looks quite the same as the second 
one. The weight of the US dollar stays above 0.8 for almost the whole period, and there is 
also problem of multicollinearity. The last sub-period, which is after about October 2015, 
is another big change since the beginning of the reform. The weight of the US dollar drops 
dramatically, while the Euro, the Japanese yen and the Russian ruble began to get some 
significant weights. 
In summary, there is a significant decline in the weight of the US dollar in China’s 
foreign exchange basket after 2015 from both Table 3.3 and Figure 3.4. 
 
3.5.2 Structural Breaks 
The rolling regressions provide some evidence of structural breaks. In this section, 
we employ the Bai-Perron test to formally test the significance of structural breaks for both 
the basic model and the model with the EMP variable. The Bai-Perron test can find 
multiple significant structural break points for the whole sample, so changes in China’s 
exchange rate regime can be identified according to those break points. 
For the basic model, the test finds a maximum of five structural break points as 
follows: 2/9/2008, 2/9/2010, 1/17/2012, 10/28/2013, and 8/25/2015. So, we can divide the 
whole sample period into six sub-periods according to these break points. The regression 
results of each sub-period are shown in Table 3.4. The weight of the US dollar is always 
around 0.9 or even close to 1, except for the last sub-period when its weight drops 
dramatically. The weights of the British pound and the Australian dollar are significant at 
5 percent significance level, in the first sub-period. The weights of the Euro and the 
Japanese yen are significant in the second sub-period. The weights of the Euro, the 
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Australian dollar and the Russian ruble are significant in the third sub-period. The weights 
of the Euro, the Japanese yen, the Australian dollar and the Russian ruble are significant 
in the fourth one. But all those weights are quite small, which are all below 0.05, and there 
is no other significant currency except the US dollar in the fifth sub-period.  
The last sub-period is significantly different from the previous one. The weight of 
the US dollar drops to 0.681, while the weights of the Euro and the Japanese yen weight 
more than 0.08 individually for the first time and the weights of the British pound and the 
Russian ruble also become significant. Overall, the Euro is significant for four times, the 
Japanese yen, the Australian dollar and the Russian ruble are significant for three times, 
and the British pound is significant for two times. While these non-US dollar major 
currencies do have some weights in China’s foreign exchange basket, their weights are 
small and thus the Chinese yuan has been almost pegged to the US dollar until the second 
half of 2015.  
For the model with the EMP variable, the Bai-Perron test can find a maximum of 
five structural break points as follows: 2008M11, 2010M07, 2012M04, 2013M12, and 
2015M08, which are quite similar to the break points of the basic model. Again, the whole 
sample period can be divided into six sub-periods and the results are shown in Table 3.5. 
The weight of the US dollar is still dominant, and the weights of other currencies are almost 
never significant except during the last sub-period. Although the British pound and the 
Australian dollar are significant at the 5 percent significance level, and the Euro are 
significant at 10 percent significance level, the coefficients of the Euro and the Australian 
dollar are negative, so there is problem of multicollinearity again, as negative weights 
cancel out positive weights. 
The EMP variable is significant during the second sub-period which is from 
November 2008 to July 2010. However, during the period of the Global Financial Crisis, 
the yuan was pegged to the US dollar and the coefficient of the EMP is very small. More 
interestingly, the EMP term is significant during the last two sub-periods and the 
coefficient becomes much larger. During the fifth sub-period (December 2013 to August 
2015), the coefficient of the EMP is 0.396 while the weight of the US dollar is still as high 
as 0.943. It means that the variations of the yuan itself has increased significantly and a 
large portion of changes in the yuan exchange rate is explained by the EMP variable, 
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although the Chinese yuan is still pegged to the US dollar, during this sub-period. And the 
coefficient becomes even larger to 0.572 during the last sub-period, while the weight of 
the US dollar drops to 0.620 and the Euro rises to 0.200. This means a significant decline 
in the weight of the US dollar and a further increase in the flexibility of the Chinese yuan 
itself.  
In summary, the structural break test results of both models are quite similar, as 
there are similar break points. The yuan is crawling pegged mainly to the US dollar instead 
of a currency basket, and its flexibility increased during the last 3-4 years of the sample 
period. After more than ten years of reform, China’s exchange rate regime finally seems 
more like a currency basket, since other currencies also have some weights, not pegged to 
the US dollar only anymore. It may move to free-floating ultimately. 
 
3.6 A VAR Model 
In addition to the multicollinearity problem, the OLS regressions may suffer from 
endogeneity issues. This is because the exchange rates of different currencies are not 
completely independent, they may be correlated with each other. 
Because foreign currencies in the basket may be correlated with each other, like 
multicollinearity problem mentioned above, there may be the endogeneity issue in OLS 
regressions, so I need to use VAR model to check if the results I get from OLS models 
above are robust. I will use the same currency basket as the OLS models and treat all 
exchange rate variables include the Chinese yuan as endogenous variables. The results of 
variance decomposition got from the VAR model show that how variations of those 
currencies affect each other.  
For variance decomposition, the ordering is very important. In this chapter, the 
currencies are ordered as (USD, EUR, GBP, JPY, CAD, AUD, RUB, CNY). It is based on 
the ranking in Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves published by 
the IMF.9 Obviously, the US dollar has the greatest impact on other currencies while it is 
the least affected by other currencies, so it is reasonable to put the US dollar in the first 
place. It is also reasonable to put the Chinese yuan in the last place as it is the currency 
                                                 
9 Source: http://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4 
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under investigation in this chapter. The lag of the VAR model is 2 periods as recommended 
by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Criterion (SC).  
I still use the same structural break points as the basic OLS model and divide the 
whole sample into six sub-periods. I get the results of the Cholesky decomposition from 
the VAR model, and report variance decompositions at two horizons: 1-week and 1-month 
in Table 3.6.  
According to the results, variations of the US dollar are always most explained by 
its own shocks, especially more than 90 percent for the 1-week horizon, in all sub-periods. 
This is in line with our expectation, as the US dollar is the most influential currency in 
international foreign exchange market. It is also interesting that variations of the Euro are 
mostly explained by shocks on the US dollar instead of shocks of itself, and it is as big as 
60-70 percent. This is surprising given that the Euro has been considered the most 
important competitor to the US dollar since its inception. Another interesting currency is 
the Japanese yen, variations of which seems mainly explained by shocks to the Euro, the 
British pound and itself but not by shocks to the US dollar. Variations of the British pound 
and the Canadian dollar are mostly explained by shocks to themselves, while variations of 
the Australian dollar and the Russian ruble are explained by shocks of themselves as well 
as other currencies to some extent.  
For the Chinese yuan, it is mostly influenced by the US dollar in all sub-periods 
except the last one. This result is very similar to that of the OLS models in previous 
sections. In the first sub-period, when the reform just begins, variations of the yuan are 
explained by shocks of the US dollar 80 and 58 percent at the 1-week and 1-month horizon, 
respectively. They increase to 93 and 89 percent in the second sub-period, when the yuan 
is repegged to the US dollar completely during the financial crisis. The third and fourth 
sub-periods are very similar to the first one. Things begin to change from the fifth sub-
period, although the US dollar still counts 63 percent for 1-week horizon, but it drops to 
19 percent for 1-month horizon while the shocks of the Chinese yuan itself increases to 55 
percent. This is similar to the OLS model with the EMP variable, as the coefficient of the 
EMP become significant in the fifth sub-period. The US dollar is much less influential to 
the yuan in the last sub-period. It drops to 41 percent, while shocks to the yuan itself 
increases to 49, for even 1-week horizon. At the 1-month horizon, the role of the US dollar 
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declines to only 21 percent which is less than the sum of the contributions from the shocks 
to the Euro and the British pound. This is also similar to the OLS models during the sixth 
sub-period.  
Comparison of the results of OLS models and those of the VAR model leads us to 
a similar conclusion. Before the end of 2013, the Chinese yuan is crawling pegged to the 
US dollar instead of a basket of major currencies, which contradicts the government 
announcement. Between 2013 to 2015, variations of the yuan exchange rate become much 
larger while the weight of the US dollar still remains high. After the second half of 2015, 
the weight of the US dollar drops a lot while the weights of other currencies rise, and 
variations of the yuan become larger. 
 
3.7 Comparison with Previous Studies 
This chapter, by applying most recent data, finds new results that are interesting 
and quite different from previous studies. Among the papers that study China’s exchange 
rate regime, my results are comparable to papers that use data after the second reform 
which took place in 2005.10 Shah, Zeileis and Patnaik (2005) use data from July 26, 2005 
to October 31, 2005, and a currency basket composed of the US dollar, the Japanese yen, 
the Euro and the British pound. They find the weight of the US dollar to be 0.9997, so the 
Chinese yuan is still pegged to the US dollar in this short period after the reform. But their 
sample is too small to be a meaningful comparison. Eichengreen (2007) uses data from 
July 22, 2005 to March 21, 2006 and find the weight of the US dollar is around 90 percent. 
They find that the weights of other currencies are not significant, and the weight of the US 
dollar is not declining. Those early results are similar to results of the first sub-period of 
the OLS models reported in the first parts of this chapter, in which the weight of the US 
dollar is close to 0.9 or higher. Cui (2012) finds the weight of the US dollar is around 0.9 
before 2007, which is similar to this chapter, but it declined to 0.7-0.8 in 2010, which is 
quite different. While in Cui (2014), it is 0.833 from January 2007 to June 2008, 0.901 
from July 2008 to June 2010, and 0.802 from July 2010 to March 2013. The results for 
2010 seems to conflict with each other for Cui (2012) and Cui (2014). Moreover, it is 
                                                 
10 Frankel and Wei (1994) use data before the first reform and Ohno (1999) uses data before the 
second reform. 
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known that the yuan was pegged to the US dollar during the financial crisis. These support 
that the results of this chapter are more reasonable.  
My results with the EMP variable are quite different from those reported in Frankel 
(2008) which also includes the EMP variable. Frankel (2008) finds that the weight of the 
US dollar falls below 0.8 during 2005 to 2007, and even around 0.6 in 2008, and the 
coefficient of the EMP can be close to 0.3 in 2008. But I find the weight of the US dollar 
is always very high until 2015. The EMP is not quite significant until after December 2013, 
and its coefficient is bigger after August 2015. These differences might be because of 
different definitions of the EMP variable. However, if we take a look at Figure 3.3, the 
yuan just appreciates against the dollar gradually, without much variation until 2014, and 
it is pegged to the dollar during the financial crisis, so the weight of the dollar in 2008 
cannot be as low as Frankel (2008) finds. Also from Figure 3.3, the variation of the yuan, 
which the EMP reflects, becomes obviously larger after 2013, so it is more reasonable that 
the EMP becomes significant after 2013. In summary, my results are more in line with the 
fact. 
If we compare the way, how we divide the whole sample into sub-periods according 
to the Bai-Perron structural break test, with the time frame when China makes important 
announcement of policy changes, we can find striking similarities. The first sub-period, 
which is from 2005 to 2008, corresponds to the beginning of the reform, and the yuan 
begins its gradual appreciation against the dollar. The second, which is from 2008 to 2010, 
corresponds to the financial crisis, and the yuan is pegged to the dollar again. The third, 
which is from 2010 to 2012, corresponds to the announcement about the restart of the 
reform on June 19, 2010, and the yuan begins to appreciate again. The forth, which is from 
2012 to 2014, corresponds to the announcement about widening the variation of the yuan 
against to the dollar from ±0.5 percent to ±1 percent on April 16, 2012. The fifth, which is 
from 2014 to 2015, corresponds to the announcement about widening the variation from 
±1 percent to ±2 percent, and the EMP becomes significant finally during this sub-period. 
The last, which is from 2015 to now, corresponds to the important change of the 
determination of central parity rate on August 11, 2015, so the weight of the US dollar 
falls dramatically, and the yuan is more flexible after that.  
 57 
 
Overall, the empirical results are somewhat different from the existing studies and 
more in line with what has happened in China’s exchange rate policy. I also find a 
significant drop in the weight of the US dollar and increase in the variation of the yuan 
itself, which never happened before. In summary, the yuan had been crawling pegged to 
and been gradually appreciating against the US dollar until the end of 2013 or the 
beginning of 2014, except during the financial crisis when the yuan was repegged to the 
dollar. The first important change occurred in 2014, when the yuan exchange rate 
variability became much larger. Another much more significant change occurred on 
August 11, 2015, after which the yuan is related to the US dollar much less than before. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I investigate China’s de facto exchange rate regime with a basic 
OLS model, a model with the EMP variable and a VAR model, using the most up to date 
data, and get new findings that are different from previous literature.  
The component currencies of the basket are determined by a set of strict criterions, 
which choose the US dollar, the Euro, the British pound, the Japanese yen, the Canadian 
dollar, the Australian dollar and the Russian ruble as the basket currencies. I derive the 
EMP variable used in this chapter through a monetary model and it captures greater 
flexibility in the Chinese yuan. This EMP reflects the variation of the yuan correctly and 
can confirm China is transferring its regime to free floating. 
The results of the OLS models and the VAR model are consistent and in line with 
the actual progress China has made during the reform of the yuan exchange rate regime. I 
can reach conclusions that the yuan had not been pegged to a basket of currencies before 
the end of 2013 or the beginning of 2014 as what the reform has claimed, but it had been 
very closely pegged to the dollar instead. However, exchange rate policies have clearly 
changed after 2014, and the variation of the yuan has become much larger, and most 
importantly, the weight of the US dollar declined dramatically after August 2015 while 
other major currencies such as the Euro, the British pound and the Japanese yen received 
more significant weights than before. 
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Table 3.1  Top 20 GDP Countries (by PPP) 
Rank Country GDP (millions of Int$) 
1 China 23,122,027 
2 United States 19,362,129 
3 India 9,446,789 
4 Japan 5,405,072 
5 Germany 4,149,573 
6 Russia 4,000,096 
7 Indonesia 3,242,966 
8 Brazil 3,219,129 
9 United Kingdom 2,880,254 
10 France 2,826,456 
11 Mexico 2,406,087 
12 Italy 2,307,073 
13 South Korea 2,127,717 
14 Saudi Arabia 2,077,408 
15 Turkey 1,789,264 
16 Spain 1,768,574 
17 Canada 1,763,785 
18 Iran 1,630,859 
19 Australia 1,235,297 
20 Thailand 1,228,941 
 
List by IMF, estimates for 2017 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP) 
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Table 3.2  Trade Volume of China’s Major Trade Partners: 2017 
Countries Import and Export Export Import 
Total 2,779,209,183 1,533,183,191 1,246,025,992 
  Includes:     
Hong Kong 193,906,508 188,954,265 4,952,243 
India 57,223,690 46,150,518 11,073,171 
Japan 205,057,504 93,021,074 112,036,430 
South Korea 189,794,493 69,662,138 120,132,355 
Taiwan 134,919,594 29,789,491 105,130,103 
ASEAN 348,406,528 188,986,664 159,419,864 
  Includes:     
Indonesia 42,870,021 23,550,748 19,319,273 
Malaysia 65,037,583 28,259,893 36,777,690 
Philippines 34,729,398 21,715,169 13,014,228 
Singapore 53,668,973 30,501,556 23,167,417 
Thailand 54,380,149 26,226,349 28,153,800 
Vietnam 81,907,699 47,985,445 33,922,254 
EU 417,419,676 251,993,658 165,426,017 
  Includes:     
UK 53,535,424 38,435,807 15,099,617 
Germany 113,636,460 48,184,031 65,452,429 
France 36,842,732 18,743,613 18,099,119 
Italy 33,554,825 19,766,522 13,788,303 
Netherlands 53,039,515 45,431,720 7,607,795 
Russia 56,946,282 29,043,132 27,903,150 
South Africa 26,535,349 10,043,285 16,492,064 
Brazil 59,357,472 19,617,795 39,739,676 
Canada 35,077,542 21,263,375 13,814,167 
US 395,327,222 291,030,309 104,296,913 
Australia 92,341,386 28,055,697 64,285,689 
New Zealand 9,813,846 3,454,507 6,359,339 
 
Unit: 10,000 Chinese yuan 
Source: General Administration of Customs, P.R. China 
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Table 3.3  Weights of Component Currencies: Rolling Regression 
Coefficient 2005M8-  2005M10 
2008M12-
2010M2 
2010M9-
2010M11 
2013M3- 
2013M5 
2015M2-  
2015M4 
2016M7-  
2016M9 
USD 0.948*** 0.968*** 0.918*** 0.910*** 0.895*** 0.652*** 
  (0.0228) (0.0153) (0.0485) (0.0320) (0.0357) (0.0383) 
EUR 0.0164 0.0195** 0.0141 0.0143 0.0512** 0.128*** 
  (0.0155) (0.00899) (0.0369) (0.0158) (0.0239) (0.0296) 
GBP -0.0192* -0.00293 0.0851** 0.0428 -0.00668 0.0825*** 
  (0.0104) (0.00949) (0.0317) (0.0273) (0.0407) (0.0287) 
JPY 0.0327*** -0.00809 0.0174 -0.0222 0.0155 0.0725*** 
  (0.00885) (0.00963) (0.0354) (0.0146) (0.0244) (0.0208) 
AUD 0.0125 -0.00732 -0.00403 0.0782*** 0.0242 0.0612** 
  (0.0104) (0.00668) (0.0340) (0.0210) (0.0184) (0.0236) 
RUB 0.00526 0.0276 -0.0173 0.000768 -0.00346 0.0330* 
  (0.0375) (0.0186) (0.0672) (0.0209) (0.00352) (0.0171) 
Constant -0.000288*** -0.000100 0.000218 0.000283 -0.00102*** 0.00128*** 
  (8.42e-05) (0.000220) (0.000421) (0.000200) (0.000301) (0.000287) 
R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.989 0.991 0.992 0.985 
 
Note: It’s too long to illustrate all results of the three-month rolling regression, so only one result for each sub-period is selected. 
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Table 3.4  Structural Break (daily data) 
Coefficient 8/4/2005-2/8/2008 
2/8/2008- 
2/9/2010 
2/9/2010-
1/17/2012 
1/17/2012-
10/28/2013 
10/28/2013-
8/25/2015 
8/25/2015-
2/14/2018 
USD 0.880*** 0.951*** 0.946*** 0.912*** 1.005*** 0.681*** 
  (0.0223) (0.00783) (0.0150) (0.0116) (0.0439) (0.0230) 
EUR -0.00465 0.0180** 0.0453*** 0.0470*** -0.0544 0.0892*** 
  (0.0205) (0.00833) (0.0120) (0.0111) (0.0361) (0.0237) 
GBP 0.0345*** 0.00303 0.0247* 0.00840 0.00818 0.0372** 
  (0.0133) (0.00638) (0.0128) (0.0139) (0.0430) (0.0166) 
JPY 0.0122 0.0140** -0.000804 0.0225*** 0.0382 0.0842*** 
  (0.00781) (0.00576) (0.00963) (0.00647) (0.0330) (0.0168) 
AUD 0.0274*** 0.00999 0.0278*** 0.0273*** 0.0202 0.0155 
  (0.00815) (0.00651) (0.00980) (0.0100) (0.0326) (0.0212) 
RUB 0.0542 0.00989 -0.0404*** 0.0286*** 0.00767 0.0349*** 
  (0.0341) (0.00737) (0.0123) (0.00965) (0.0102) (0.0114) 
Constant -0.000922*** -0.000505*** -0.000635*** -0.000270*** 0.000561 0.000226 
  (8.65E-05) (8.95E-05) (0.000119) (9.03E-05) (0.000357) (0.000203) 
R-squared 0.980 0.994 0.980 0.973 0.797 0.878 
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Table 3.5  Structural Break with the EMP (monthly data) 
Coefficient 2006M11-2008M11 
2008M11-
2010M07 
2010M07-
2012M04 
2012M04-
2013M12 
2013M12-
2015M08 
2015M08-
2018M02 
USD 0.865*** 0.975*** 0.966*** 1.076*** 0.943*** 0.620***  
(0.108) (0.0279) (0.0875) (0.0597) (0.103) (0.0793) 
EUR 0.0769 -0.00972 0.0534 -0.0692 -0.202* 0.200**  
(0.171) (0.0321) (0.0529) (0.0521) (0.107) (0.0860) 
GBP -0.0521 0.0271 -0.0330 0.115** 0.353** 0.0917*  
(0.0670) (0.0159) (0.0744) (0.0532) (0.138) (0.0533) 
JPY 0.0347 0.0195 0.0468 -0.0484 -0.0838 0.0732  
(0.0517) (0.0191) (0.0433) (0.0311) (0.0576) (0.0500) 
AUD 0.0352 -0.00578 0.0189 -0.0420 -0.179** 0.0215  
(0.0575) (0.0375) (0.0518) (0.0305) (0.0758) (0.0676) 
RUB 0.0848 -0.00803 -0.0239 0.0517 -0.0159 0.00975  
(0.224) (0.0113) (0.0488) (0.0456) (0.0215) (0.0320) 
EMP 0.0857 0.0956** -0.00486 -0.0204 0.396*** 0.572***  
(0.0530) (0.0442) (0.0575) (0.0342) (0.0771) (0.0961) 
Constant 0.00302 -0.000717 0.00335*** 0.000652 -0.00559*** 0.00122  
(0.00175) (0.000812) (0.000967) (0.000686) (0.00145) (0.00109) 
R-squared 0.988 0.996 0.966 0.975 0.968 0.929 
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Table 3.6  Variance Decompositions: 1-Week and 1-Month Horizons 
  U_USD U_EUR U_GBP U_JPY U_CAD U_AUD U_RUB U_CNY 
  2005-2008 
USD 91.634  67.715  0.700  2.983  0.079  10.198  0.461  1.712  6.406  9.849  0.184  1.896  0.041  3.201  0.495  2.446  
EUR 61.636  47.203  26.942  19.499  0.124  13.704  0.194  1.041  5.018  6.361  0.820  4.366  0.830  3.769  4.438  4.058  
GBP 14.186  12.959  1.084  3.878  80.517  50.904  0.001  3.904  2.617  12.301  0.003  5.124  0.849  7.088  0.742  3.841  
JPY 2.872  4.482  35.027  28.300  20.328  27.176  40.592  26.571  0.332  2.692  0.131  5.254  0.650  3.986  0.068  1.537  
CAD 17.328  11.778  1.356  3.393  1.431  10.219  1.526  5.629  74.730  54.504  1.576  5.676  1.938  4.093  0.115  4.708  
AUD 0.575  11.311  18.140  11.631  14.929  26.079  17.409  10.381  6.614  11.403  42.091  20.332  0.000  6.733  0.241  2.130  
RUB 26.417  23.533  12.887  11.755  0.926  7.043  4.097  6.420  2.498  4.779  2.211  2.643  49.631  40.969  1.334  2.858  
CNY 80.384  57.973  1.618  2.626  0.290  12.911  1.856  3.247  4.079  5.276  0.312  1.235  0.325  2.023  11.136  14.709  
  2008-2010 
USD 97.245  90.795  1.224  1.348  0.091  0.342  0.390  2.107  0.647  1.543  0.237  1.908  0.148  0.459  0.019  1.498  
EUR 67.531  71.125  29.506  21.821  0.009  0.258  0.289  2.154  1.570  2.907  0.693  0.347  0.057  1.050  0.345  0.338  
GBP 6.433  5.021  5.141  3.185  80.408  56.382  0.095  4.933  0.995  4.009  4.504  17.967  0.872  6.774  1.554  1.729  
JPY 1.919  3.857  42.838  31.098  21.989  26.951  30.092  16.679  0.263  3.100  1.624  14.623  0.184  2.454  1.091  1.238  
CAD 2.192  5.405  5.771  8.452  8.985  10.108  0.717  3.714  81.070  56.166  0.258  11.008  0.065  0.321  0.943  4.825  
AUD 3.368  9.217  4.446  7.376  12.041  13.480  14.966  9.868  11.481  23.512  48.832  27.240  0.034  2.445  4.832  6.862  
RUB 6.070  10.797  3.059  3.126  3.158  9.475  2.641  1.898  2.275  11.303  4.662  7.062  77.362  51.542  0.772  4.795  
CNY 93.194  88.580  2.080  1.923  0.245  1.306  0.751  3.232  0.869  0.647  0.352  2.579  0.059  0.345  2.450  1.388  
  2010-2012 
USD 91.663  49.765  1.313  10.234  0.734  2.941  3.798  13.626  0.128  6.894  0.603  6.506  1.753  8.273  0.008  1.761  
EUR 65.750  32.359  29.887  26.457  0.527  1.989  0.004  19.948  1.078  4.922  0.375  5.482  2.261  6.317  0.118  2.525  
GBP 6.402  6.451  6.708  4.496  81.969  63.151  1.620  7.605  1.941  3.115  1.121  4.159  0.239  10.868  0.000  0.155  
JPY 2.539  4.652  21.926  16.319  13.712  11.683  59.699  56.015  1.426  2.283  0.237  3.341  0.396  2.181  0.065  3.525  
CAD 0.416  1.793  0.718  1.506  13.471  11.876  7.624  6.750  75.985  60.841  0.650  4.055  0.083  11.601  1.053  1.577  
AUD 1.231  6.328  5.106  7.551  10.583  14.453  10.661  16.722  31.230  22.645  40.626  30.105  0.013  1.072  0.551  1.123  
RUB 2.477  6.797  8.414  8.787  5.682  7.314  7.736  8.864  13.432  14.557  19.629  17.477  42.418  34.660  0.212  1.544  
CNY 83.838  48.456  1.722  11.803  1.143  1.990  4.867  11.448  0.029  8.608  1.523  5.209  1.355  8.003  5.522  4.483  
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Table 3.6  Variance Decompositions: 1-Week and 1-Month Horizons (continued) 
  U_USD U_EUR U_GBP U_JPY U_CAD U_AUD U_RUB U_CNY 
  2012-2013 
USD 93.612  71.983  0.781  1.955  0.046  11.029  1.517  4.624  0.528  4.292  3.131  3.099  0.101  2.527  0.285  0.491  
EUR 59.197  56.327  38.276  34.999  0.360  1.406  0.843  2.333  0.092  1.693  0.911  1.441  0.057  1.278  0.264  0.522  
GBP 11.690  7.964  3.700  3.477  77.748  51.788  0.051  3.643  6.193  10.681  0.008  1.532  0.484  18.427  0.126  2.488  
JPY 0.089  1.078  49.618  38.113  6.439  6.234  43.461  31.087  0.106  1.198  0.145  1.926  0.005  14.754  0.138  5.609  
CAD 7.164  8.494  1.883  1.486  2.750  4.027  0.518  1.092  84.697  72.537  0.071  1.388  2.183  6.630  0.734  4.345  
AUD 1.132  0.458  10.441  4.813  0.252  2.092  0.792  13.727  12.943  2.778  74.377  30.661  0.000  39.363  0.064  6.108  
RUB 7.011  3.163  0.686  2.633  2.355  1.730  10.451  13.426  3.033  2.173  13.254  8.980  63.179  59.617  0.031  8.279  
CNY 87.860  68.067  2.769  3.397  0.051  10.000  1.051  3.735  0.396  3.989  3.455  3.132  0.238  4.046  4.181  3.634  
  2013-2015 
USD 83.472  57.564  3.480  4.493  0.049  1.638  11.543  10.006  0.708  14.180  0.287  1.122  0.362  2.167  0.098  8.831  
EUR 64.860  45.289  29.993  22.566  0.982  4.097  3.489  4.083  0.244  7.677  0.121  1.234  0.135  2.246  0.178  12.809  
GBP 4.204  8.999  7.529  11.053  79.957  56.019  1.462  3.125  5.938  4.481  0.442  0.642  0.189  7.263  0.279  8.416  
JPY 0.914  4.515  22.741  27.944  11.036  11.129  50.384  36.088  2.627  3.058  1.158  1.788  10.286  7.495  0.854  7.984  
CAD 7.225  6.424  1.359  4.882  0.365  4.535  4.508  3.886  83.027  57.145  0.374  0.894  2.542  3.511  0.600  18.722  
AUD 2.915  2.850  1.063  9.489  1.764  6.960  0.234  0.664  34.156  38.158  58.336  34.248  1.532  4.085  0.000  3.545  
RUB 4.066  3.139  0.197  1.677  2.698  4.848  6.579  3.717  4.940  19.264  7.818  7.636  73.223  38.028  0.479  21.693  
CNY 62.933  18.922  7.821  6.103  0.053  3.135  10.054  4.111  0.911  6.756  0.414  1.551  0.663  4.377  17.150  55.044  
  2015-2018 
USD 96.271  65.107  0.821  7.018  0.009  2.008  0.294  0.707  1.313  2.225  0.004  7.302  1.259  2.495  0.029  13.137  
EUR 58.108  39.256  38.141  30.695  0.194  3.259  2.221  2.939  0.082  2.490  0.110  12.350  0.995  1.815  0.149  7.196  
GBP 10.460  8.099  5.789  4.824  81.340  76.609  1.280  1.856  0.543  0.884  0.027  1.669  0.009  0.998  0.553  5.061  
JPY 4.436  6.282  6.498  5.257  29.405  39.751  56.324  37.950  0.000  1.079  0.795  3.443  0.544  2.535  1.999  3.704  
CAD 0.225  10.999  1.642  4.209  2.167  7.785  0.452  8.100  92.376  48.892  2.390  6.794  0.541  5.563  0.208  7.659  
AUD 3.354  2.725  0.256  1.333  1.623  5.420  0.077  4.573  24.631  20.902  69.950  53.216  0.109  0.943  0.000  10.889  
RUB 0.977  1.108  1.830  1.928  1.681  1.753  2.741  2.893  10.280  15.204  9.742  16.117  72.622  60.170  0.126  0.828  
CNY 40.837  21.197  0.629  6.297  3.442  15.863  0.140  1.195  1.527  1.662  4.564  2.676  0.184  5.555  48.677  45.554  
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Figure 3.1  China’s Foreign Reserve: 1988-2018 
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Source: The People’s Bank of China 
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Figure 3.2  Chinese Yuan Exchange Rate against US Dollar: 1981-2018 
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Figure 3.3  Chinese Yuan Exchange Rate against US Dollar: 2005-18 
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Figure 3.4  Weights of Component Currencies: Rolling Regression 
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Note: The number at the bottom of the figure means the month from the beginning of the 
sample, which corresponds the sequence number of the rolling regression.  
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CHAPTER 4. ARE CHINA’S CAPITAL CONTROLS STILL EFFECTIVE? 
4.1 Introduction 
In recent years, we have seen a significant decline in China’s foreign exchange 
reserves.1 It has fallen from a peak of nearly 4 trillion US dollars in 2014 to around 3 
trillion US dollars today. The sharp decline in foreign reserves might be due to sudden 
stops in capital inflows that are related to concerns about China’s economic development 
and future. China, like most developing countries, has taken many steps to prevent capital 
outflows.2 But as economic globalization deepens, traditional capital controls may no 
longer be as effective as they used to be. Therefore, it is very important as well as 
interesting to study whether China’s capital controls are still effective. 
China has a long history of capital controls. Before the “reform and opening-up” in 
1978, when the level of its economic development was very low, China has strictly 
centralized planned management of foreign exchange. The government implemented 
unified management of foreign trade and foreign exchange, and mandatory planned 
management for the balance of payments. All foreign exchange receipts must be sold to 
the government, and foreign exchange earnings were distributed by centralized plans; there 
were hardly any foreign debts or investments; the Chinese yuan (CNY) is only used as an 
accounting tool. 
After the “reform and opening-up”, in accordance with the fundamental 
requirements of economic reform, China’s foreign exchange management system has been 
gradually redirected to reduction of mandatory plans, and the continuous cultivation and 
enhancement of the fundamental role of market mechanisms in the allocation of foreign 
exchange resources. In 1994, China abolished the dual exchange rates and established a 
single exchange rate regime; in 1996, CNY achieved current account convertibility; in 
2005, China gave up a fixed US dollar (USD) exchange rate and changed its exchange rate 
regime to “A managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand 
with reference to a basket of currencies”.  
                                                 
1 See Figure 4.1 
2 For example, on Jan 1, 2018, China State Administration of Foreign Exchange put a new 
restriction for foreign cash withdrawal on personal bank accounts, that account holder cannot withdraw 
more than more 100 thousand Chinese yuan per calendar year.  
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With rapid economic growth and deepening reforms, China’s important goal has 
shifted to achievement of capital account convertibility and the internationalization of the 
yuan. For example, in 2003, China announced that, under effective control of risks, it 
would relax the restrictions on cross-border capital transactions step-by-step and 
selectively, to achieve capital account convertibility for CNY; in 2015, China repeated this 
goal again. The government took an active and gradual path to relax capital controls, 
through diverse methods such as pilot free trade zones. On October 1, 2016, CNY was 
added to the Special Drawing Right (SDR) basket as the fifth major currency – an 
important step toward internationalization of the yuan. In short, China has been gradually 
moving forward in its economic and financial market reforms and become more open to 
the world financial markets. It is an interesting issue now whether China’s capital control 
regime remains effective in the process of financial market liberalization.  
The theoretical origin of capital controls comes from “the Impossible Trinity,” 
according to which a country cannot achieve the three policy objectives at the same time: 
a fixed exchange rate, free capital mobility, and an independent monetary policy. The 
hypothesis can be traced to the Mundell and Fleming in the 1960s. It is further developed 
and explained by Krugman in 1999. It implies that a country like China that has chosen a 
fixed exchange rate may not enjoy independent monetary policy and free capital mobility. 
In order to maintain an independent monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate regime, 
the capital mobility has to be limited, so China has to impose capital controls on capital 
flows. As a result, we can measure the effectiveness of capital controls through measuring 
capital mobility. 
There is no universally accepted method to measure capital mobility or the 
effectiveness of capital controls in the literature, so using only one method may be 
inaccurate and unreliable. (Montiel, 1994) We need to use more than one method to study 
the effectiveness of China’s capital controls. The existing research on the measurement of 
the effectiveness of capital controls or capital mobility can be roughly divided into two 
categories: De Jure and De Facto. The former reflects the regulation of capital account 
transactions by the administrative authorities of a country through policies and regulations; 
while the latter reflects the actual capital flows of a country. De jure methods are the 
nominal capital controls intensity of a country, so it mainly focuses on how strict a 
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country’s capital controls are, but it does not mean those controls are effective actually. 
De facto methods measure capital controls, through the observations and estimations of 
how economic and financial variables, like interest rates, are affected by limited capital 
mobility. Because limited capital mobility is a major purpose and result of capital controls, 
de facto methods measuring capital mobility can reflect the effectiveness of capital 
controls. 
In this chapter, I will use de jure data to show how strict China’s capital controls 
are, and then use de facto methods to check its effectiveness. To better investigate this 
question, this chapter employs various indicators of capital controls and the mobility of 
international capital. They include the de jure indicators, the saving-investment correlation 
test, covered interest rate parity, real interest rate differentials and the Edwards-Kahn 
model, on the perspective of government regulations, real economy, short-term capital 
arbitrage motives, and monetary economy respectively.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 is the literature review. Section 3 
describes history of China’s capital controls, why China wants capital controls, and how 
China implements its capital controls. Section 4 describes the methods to measure capital 
controls effectiveness, in this chapter. Section 5 is the description of data used in this 
chapter. Section 6 is the empirical results from all the methods. Section 7 discusses those 
results and compared them to results of other literature. And section 8 concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Financial Liberalization and Capital Controls 
Debates about advantages and disadvantages of capital controls have a long history. 
As early as the era of mercantilism, a country was more eager to leave gold and silver, as 
currencies, in it, so it is not surprising that there were restrictions on the trading of gold 
and silver at that time, just like today’s capital controls. Later, with Adam Smith's 
emphasis on the role of the free market, this idea of regulation was gradually suppressed. 
However, after entering the 20th century and the experience of the two world wars, capital 
controls regained importance. Because of the balance of payments deficit and serious 
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capital outflow, policy makers have used capital controls in order to make up for huge war 
expenditures. This is the real debut of the capital controls in history. 
The establishment of the Bretton Woods system after the end of World War II 
linked capital controls to the fixed exchange rate system. Keynes believed that capital 
controls were an important factor for maintaining financial stability under the Bretton 
Woods system. The rise of capital liberalization in the 1970s followed the abolition of the 
gold-exchange standard of the Bretton Woods system. For a long time, until the 1990s, the 
mainstream view in the literature has supported the free flow of capital and opposed capital 
controls. However, the financial crisis that has occurred since the 1990s has once again 
begun to make people rethink the role of capital controls.  
The main point of supporting free capital mobility is that it is good to the promotion 
of competition in the financial market, to the correct reflection of asset supply and demand 
by price signals, to the effective allocation of capital, and to the provision of multiple 
channels for investors to diversify investment risks. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) 
point out that due to the existence of "financial repression" in many developing countries, 
financial market development is incomplete and capital allocation is seriously distorted, 
so economic growth has been hampered. They proposed that financial deepening is the 
solution, in which the government should liberalize the controls on financial and capital 
markets, especially on interest rates, to reflect the price of assets correctly and optimize 
the allocation of capital. Bartolini and Drazen (1997) argue that capital controls are often 
seen as a sign of government policy failures and weak economic fundamentals, so that 
market participants lose their trust under the guidance of bad signal expectations and this 
can lead to capital outflow and financial crises. Edwards (1999) points out that capital 
controls can cause corruption, lead to distortions in resource allocation, and market 
participants can easily look for opportunities to circumvent controls, making capital 
controls almost always ineffective. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) also believe that 
international investors will always find ways to circumvent control, resulting in less 
effective capital controls, and this will also lead to market price distortions, increase 
transaction costs, and increase enterprises' cost. Ostry et al. (2011) review the argument 
for proper management of capital inflows, arguing that if the economy is operating close 
to potential, the reserves are sufficient, the exchange rate is not undervalued, and the flow 
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may be transitory, then control over capital inflows may usefully constitute a part of policy 
toolkit. Huang (2011) takes 118 emerging markets from 1970 to 2008 as samples and finds 
that the relaxation of the degree of capital controls will reduce the probability of a currency 
crisis; otherwise the stricter the capital controls are, the more vulnerable the economic 
fundamentals are. Larrain and Stumpner (2017) find that opening the capital account is 
associated with higher aggregate total factor productivity and can increase manufacturing 
productivity through a more efficient firm capital allocation by 8 percent to 13 percent, 
through studying the effects of capital liberalization on firm capital allocation and 
aggregate productivity in 10 Eastern European countries.  
However, since the 1990s, financial crises have occurred frequently, and 
international short-term capital flows have become a major destabilizing factor in the 
financial and economic markets of emerging market countries. As early as 1978, Tobin 
proposes to reduce the impact of international short-term speculative capital flows by 
imposing a Tobin tax on foreign exchange transactions. After the Asian financial crisis, 
scholars begin to pay more attention to capital controls. Bhagwati (1998) and Cooper 
(1998) point out that the free flow of capital would exacerbate market distortions when 
there is incomplete information in the market respectively. In 1999, based on the Mundell-
Fleming model, Krugman proposed the "the Impossible Trinity" theory, expounding that 
the free capital mobility, the independence of monetary policy and the fixed exchange rate 
regime cannot be realized at the same time, so a country can only choose two of the three 
goals. Ariyoshi et al. (2000) examine the capital control practices and effects of a series of 
emerging market countries and find that capital controls have a positive regulatory effect 
on capital inflows, although they cannot effectively prevent capital flight. 
Ostry et al. (2010) propose that capital controls will help regulate capital inflows, 
so capital controls will be necessary under specific circumstance. The IMF's World 
Economic Outlook, published in April 2011, points out that some emerging market 
countries that have implemented appropriate macroeconomic policies can implement 
prudent capital controls to deal with large-scale capital inflows. This is the first time the 
IMF has expressed its support for capital controls in decades. Capital controls are 
increasingly accepted worldwide, and views on the nature of capital controls has gradually 
changed from protectionism in the past to a necessary step for economic stability. Recent 
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research shows that capital controls are also a correction to market failures that help to 
improve consumer welfare. Gallagher (2012) argues that it is wrong to regard capital 
controls implemented in emerging economies as financial protectionism. Capital controls 
are a means of correcting market failures caused by imperfect information, crisis spread, 
uncertainty and any other factors, as well as tools to promote stability and growth in 
developing countries. It is the "new correctionism" rather than the "new protectionism". 
 
4.2.2 Measurement and Effectiveness of Capital Controls 
The existing research on the measurement and effectiveness of capital controls can 
be roughly divided into two categories: De Jure and De Facto. For de jure, the main idea 
is to compose a composite index based on specific regulations implemented for capital 
controls, thus quantifying the degree of capital control of a country. Thus the de jure data, 
which quantify the capital control policies implemented by a country, are used to show 
how strict a country’s capital controls are. De facto measurements are based on the 
correlations between different economic and financial variables. These methods measure 
the effectiveness of capital controls by testing changes in macroeconomic variables such 
as prices. 
For de jure indicators, Epstein and Schor (1992) first use the Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), published by the IMF, to 
construct quantitative indicators of the degree of capital controls in each country. The 
sample countries are 16 OECD countries for 1966-1986. According to this idea, Quinn 
(1997) makes detailed and differentiated values for the intensity of capital controls based 
on the AREAER information. Their sample includes 20 developed countries and 23 
developing countries, which have now become one of the most widely used studies in 
empirical analyses. Chinn and Ito (2008) also construct a capital control intensity indicator 
for 181 countries around the world from 1970 to 2005 based on the AREAER, which is 
widely used in the empirical study of capital account opening. 3  Also based on the 
AREAER, Schindler (2009) reclassified assets into six categories, in which stocks, bonds, 
                                                 
3 Their data is available at http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm. The data have been 
updated to 2015 on July 20, 2017.  
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and money market instruments are subdivided into four subcategories according to the 
direction of capital flows and trading objects. Quinn, Schindler and Toyoda (2011) update 
the original Quinn (1997) to data through 2007. Fernández et al. (2016) build a new index 
of capital controls of 100 countries from 1995 to 2013, on the data presented in Schindler 
(2009) and other datasets of AREAER.4 They also characterize the data with respect to 
controls across asset categories, inflows and outflows. 
For de facto indicators, Montiel and Reinhart (1999) use capital control index data 
from 15 emerging market countries and find that capital controls have little impact on the 
size of capital flows, but they can lead to changes in capital flow structure, from short-
term capital and portfolio investment to foreign direct investment (FDI). David (2009) 
uses the generalized method of moments (GMM) method to study the effectiveness of 
price-based capital controls in Chile and Colombia. The results show that in Chile, capital 
controls have succeeded in reducing net short-term capital inflows but have no effect on 
long-term capital flows; in Colombia, capital controls also have an impact on long-term 
capital flows. Coelho and Gallagher (2010) study the impact of capital controls in 
Colombia and Thailand during the global financial crisis in 2008 to prevent excessive 
capital inflows and changes in capital inflows. The study finds that capital controls 
implemented in Colombia and Thailand both effectively reduce total capital inflows. 
Athukorala and Jongwanich (2012) use quarterly data to measure the effectiveness of 
Malaysia's capital controls. The results show that at least in the short to medium term, 
targeted capital controls are effective for short-term capital inflows and outflows. The 
capital controls imposed on capital inflows by Malaysia in the first half of 1994 help to 
alleviate the inflow of short-term capital, especially the inflow of short-term bank credit 
capital; and the capital controls implemented during 1998-1999 prevent the outflow of 
short-term capital and win time for the government's easy monetary and fiscal policies. 
Jayasuriya and Leu (2012) use a model to analyze the effectiveness of Indonesia's 
implementation of capital controls during the period 1990-2010. The results of the study 
indicate that capital control for long-term international capital flows are effective, whether 
from 1990-2010 or from 2000-2010 empirical results, but it is basically ineffective for 
                                                 
4 Their data is available at http://www.columbia.edu/~mu2166/fkrsu/. The data have been updated 
to 2015 in 2017.  
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short-term capital flows such as securities investment. At the same time, the impact of 
capital inflow control on securities investment capital flows in 2000-2010 is short-lived, 
but it changes the capital structure flowing into Indonesia, making short-term capital 
transforming to long-term capital. Esaka and Takagi (2012) examine the impact of the 
Japanese government's implementation of capital controls on short-term capital flows in 
the 1970s. The results show that the increase in marginal reserve requirements will reduce 
short-term capital inflows, but not statistically significant, which means the price elasticity 
of short-term capital flows is small. Klein (2012) studies the distinction between long-
standing controls (walls) and episodic controls (gates), using a data set of 44 advanced and 
emerging market economies from 1995 to 2010. The results show little evidence of the 
efficacy of capital controls, and question calls for a greater use of episodic controls. 
 
4.2.3 Literature on China's Capital Controls 
China’s capital controls have been the subject of extensive investigation. Most 
studies show that China's capital controls are still valid, but with the gradual liberalization 
of capital account, this effectiveness may gradually decline.  
Ma and McCauley (2008) investigate the effectiveness of China's capital controls 
in terms of price and capital flows and believe that China's capital controls are basically 
still binding. Chen (2012) uses the Threshold Autoregressive Model (TAR) to study the 
difference between the Chinese yuan onshore interest rate and the NDF implied offshore 
interest rate from 2003 to 2010 and finds that the effectiveness of capital controls measured 
by the threshold increases during the financial crisis. Cheung and Herrala (2014) study the 
covered interest differentials, and the results show persistent and significant differences 
which indicate that China's capital controls remain valid. Chang, Liu and Spiegel (2015) 
study China's optimal monetary policy under various policies including capital controls, 
fixed exchange rate regimes, and control of foreign capital inflows. They find that the 
combination of capital controls and fixed exchange rates disrupts China's monetary policy 
and reduced the ability to maintain macroeconomic stability during the financial crisis. 
However, after using the DSGE model to analyze different policies, they find that most of 
the welfare gains achieved under complete liberalization can be obtained by liberalizing 
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the capital account or exchange rate. Shen and Yang (2015) investigate the correlation 
between capital account liberalization and China's financial stability and use the Finite 
Distribution Lag Model to quantify the correlation between capital account liberalization 
and currency crisis. The results show that capital account liberalization is harmful to stable 
official markets in the short term of one year and can promote China's financial stability 
in the long run. 
 
4.2.4 My Contributions 
The following is a list of contributions I intend to achieve in this chapter:  
1. As there is no universally-agreed-upon method to measure the effectiveness of 
capital controls, I employ five different methods including a de jure indicator, the 
saving-investment correlation test, covered interest rate parity, real interest rate 
differentials and the Edwards-Kahn model. The goal is to let the data and the 
results speak themselves about China’s capital control regime and, as a by-product, 
to compare the validity of various methods. 
2. For a better understanding of the macroeconomic consequences of capital controls, 
I compare China with countries or regions that have little or no capital controls. 
For the saving-investment correlation test, I will China with the US, the UK and 
Japan; for the tests of covered interest rate parity, real interest rate differentials 
and the Edwards-Kahn model, I compare China with the Eurozone and Japan. 
3. China’s foreign reserves declined sharply after 2014, but there is no new study 
about China’s capital controls on this period. It would be interesting to investigate 
China’s capital controls with the newest data updated to 2018. 
 
4.3 China’s Capital Controls 
4.3.1 A Brief History of China’s Foreign Exchange Controls Reform 
China’s capital controls are mainly for foreign exchange controls. Since the reform 
and opening up in 1978, after nearly 40 years of efforts, China has established a foreign 
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exchange management system. Since 1978, China's foreign exchange management system 
reform has gone through three important stages. 
In the first stage from 1978 to 1993, the reform of the foreign exchange control 
system started. This stage is characterized by the enhancement of corporate foreign 
exchange autonomy and the implementation of a dual exchange rate system. In the foreign-
related economic field, the system of foreign exchange settlement and control in the past 
has gradually loosened, and export enterprises have begun to have certain foreign 
exchange autonomy, in order to mobilize the enthusiasm of export enterprises to earn 
foreign exchange, and to ensure that limited foreign exchange resources are concentrated 
in national economic development. Since 1979, the foreign exchange retention method has 
been implemented, and a certain proportion of foreign exchange has been reserved for 
enterprises that earn foreign exchange, and the transfer of foreign exchange quota between 
enterprises has been allowed. The official exchange rate coexists with the exchange rate 
of the market. In general, at this stage, the foreign exchange control system is in the process 
of transition from the planning system to the market regulation. The planned allocation of 
foreign exchange resources is still dominant, but the market mechanism is invigorated and 
continuously developed to promote foreign investment, encourage export earnings, and 
support domestic economic development.  
In the second stage from 1994 to 2000, the framework of the foreign exchange 
control system was initially determined. At the beginning of 1994, China carried out major 
reforms to the foreign exchange system, abolished the foreign exchange retention system, 
implemented the bank settlement system, and cancelled the dual exchange rates system. 
In 1996, all limits on international payments and transfers of current account were lifted, 
so the Chinese yuan current account convertibility was realized. In 1997, during the Asian 
financial crisis, China focused on strengthening the control of capital outflows and 
successfully resisted the impact of the Asian financial crisis. Overall, at this stage, China 
has initially established a foreign exchange control system framework. The market base of 
foreign exchange supply and demand has been continuously expanded, and the foundation 
for the market mechanism to allocate foreign exchange resources was formed.  
In the third stage since 2001, the foreign exchange control system based on market 
regulation has been further improved. Since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
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at the end of 2001, China has accelerated its integration into the global economy, its 
opening up has been further expanded, and the balance of payment has continued to have 
a large surplus. The reform of the foreign exchange control system has been promoted in 
depth, actively promoting the facilitation of trade and investment, steadily promoting the 
capital account convertibility, and strengthening the management of cross-border capital 
flows. With the goal of standardization, specialization and internationalization, China has 
established an investment-based management model as well as a risk management 
framework, to improve the system and mechanism of large-scale foreign exchange reserve 
controls. In July 2005, China launched the most important exchange rate reform for the 
Chinese yuan in history, and China’s exchange rate regime was changed to “a managed 
floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with reference to a 
basket of currencies”. In 2008, the newly revised Foreign Exchange Management 
Regulations established a balanced supervision approach and explicitly eliminated the de 
jure mandatory foreign exchange settlement system. In the 2008 financial crisis, capital 
controls played a positive role in ensuring the overall security of foreign exchange reserve 
assets and withstanding the impact of the international financial crisis. The maximum 
allowed daily volatility of the exchange rate of RMB against the US dollar was further 
expanded three times in 2007, 2012 and 2014, to the current 2 percent. The Chinese yuan 
keeps becoming more convertible and was added to IMF’s SDR basket as one of five major 
currencies in October 2016, which means significant progress in the internationalization 
of the Chinese yuan.  
 
4.3.2 Current Situation of China’s Capital Outflows 
After the reform and opening up since 1978, China’s capital controls have been 
evolving and China is becoming a more open country. Not only do foreign countries have 
huge investments in China, but China also invests more and more in the rest of the world. 
China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) and outward direct investment (ODI) have grown 
from almost zero for both to 144 billion and 158 billion US dollars in 2017, respectively. 
The Chinese yuan is becoming more convertible, and a larger part of world’s foreign 
reserve currencies. 
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China has accumulated huge foreign reserves which reached a peak of 4 trillion US 
dollars in 2014. However, as Figure 4.1 shows, China’s foreign reserves fell sharply in 
2015 and 2016, reaching around 3 trillion US dollars, and recovered partially since 2017. 
Figure 4.2 indicates that the declines were 342 billion and 449 billion US dollars in 2015 
and 2016, respectively.  
Figure 4.3 reveals that China suffered a net capital outflow for three consecutive 
years from 2014 to 2016. The scale of annual capital outflow is huge in 2015 and 2016, 
reaching 434 billion and 416 billion US dollars respectively and a total of 902 billion US 
dollars in three years. Because there is still surplus in the current account, the deficit in the 
capital account is the main reason for China's balance of payments deficit. According to 
the quarterly balance of payments shown in Figure 4.4, from 2014Q2 to 2016Q4, China 
has faced a continuous capital account deficit for 11 consecutive quarters, reaching a 
maximum of 150 billion US dollars in the single quarter of 2015Q4.  
Regarding the composition of capital flows, Figure 4.5 shows that “other 
investments,” which include other equity, currency and deposits, loans, insurance and 
pensions, trade credit and other receivables, is the main reason for the deficit in the capital 
account. This is a major part of the capital outflows. Another possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that Chinese companies have acquired large-scale assets throughout the 
world during these years. From 2015Q3 to 2016Q3, there is also deficit in direct 
investment, which means more ODI than FDI. In fact, 2016 is the first year since the 
reform and opening up that ODI exceeded FDI. The situation seems to have improved 
since 2017Q1, for both direct investment and others. 
 
4.4 Methods to Measure Capital Controls 
Because there is no uniform standard method for measuring the effectiveness of 
capital controls, this chapter employs five different methods: (i) de jure indicators, (ii) the 
saving-investment correlation test, (iii) covered interest rate parity, (iv) real interest rate 
differentials and (v) the Edwards-Kahn model. 
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4.4.1 De Jure Indicators 
For de jure indicators, the main ideas are composing a compound indicator based 
on specific measures taken by the government on capital controls, thus quantifying the 
degree of capital controls of a country. Important examples are Epstein and Schor (1992), 
Quinn (1997), Chinn and Ito (2008), Schindler (2009), and Fernández et al. (2016). 
I use data from Chinn and Ito (2008) and Fernández et al. (2016) in this chapter, 
because their data is publicly available and updated to 2015 on their websites. Chinn and 
Ito (2008) is called Chinn-Ito indicator below. Fernández et al. (2016) are composed by 
Fernández, Klein, Rebucci, Schindler and Uribe, so I will call it as FKRSU indicator below. 
The two indicators are used as a descriptive tool to show how China’s de jure capital 
controls evolved over time. 
 
4.4.2 The Saving-Investment Correlation Test 
This method is first introduced by Feldstein and Horioka (1979), they propose an 
analytical framework for measuring the degree of capital flows through the correlation 
between investment and saving. The basic idea is that when controlling capital flows, a 
country's domestic saving and investment are highly correlated because the country cannot 
obtain external capital and can only invest with its own saving. However, under the 
condition of free capital mobility, such restrictions are lifted. A small-open country can 
freely borrow capital to make up for the lack of domestic saving, or export capital to find 
the best investment opportunities, so the correlation between investment and saving will 
be greatly reduced.  
Jansen (2000) revises the Feldstein-Horioka model and builds an error correction 
model to examine the long-term and short-term relationship between saving rate and 
investment rate. I employ this model as the following form. 
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In this equation, 𝐼𝐼
𝑌𝑌
 is the domestic investment rate and 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑌𝑌
 is the domestic saving rate. 𝛽𝛽 
measures the extent to which investment responds to changes in a unit of saving in the 
short term, thereby providing a measurement of short-term capital mobility. When 𝛽𝛽 is 
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bigger, domestic investment is more related to domestic saving in the short term, which 
implies that capital mobility is lower and capital controls are more effective in the short 
term. 𝛼𝛼 is the coefficient of the difference between the saving rate and the investment rate, 
and it tests whether these two variances are cointegrated in the long run. If 𝛼𝛼 is significant, 
there is a cointegration between the saving rate and the investment rate or a long-run co-
movement of the two series. 𝛼𝛼  picks up the speed of convergence to the long-run 
equilibrium. 
Eq (4.1) is a static OLS regression analysis which shows the average correlation 
between saving and investment over a period of time, but it cannot show any structural 
changes. To investigate time variation of 𝛽𝛽, we use the Karlman filter to estimate a time-
varying parameter model. Assuming that the time-varying parameter model is an 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(1) 
process, we can get the following Karlman filter system. 
�
�
𝐼𝐼
𝑌𝑌
�
𝑡𝑡
= 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 �𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 �𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐0 + 𝑐𝑐1𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡   (4.2) 
 
4.4.3 Covered Interest Rate Parity 
Under the condition of free capital mobility, complete information and low 
transaction costs, the expected returns from domestic and foreign assets – that are identical 
in riskiness and liquidity except the currency of denomination – should be identical 
because otherwise there will be opportunities for arbitrage. The interest parity condition 
provides the resulting relationship between the interest rates and the exchange rates. 
The presence and effectiveness of capital controls can be tested by examining the 
deviation from interest parity. Large and persistent deviations would indicate their 
effectiveness. This kind of method has been popular in the literature. See, for example, 
Dooley and Isard (1980), Otani and Tiwari (1981), Ma and McCauley (2008), and Chamon 
and Garcia (2016).  
If there are no capital controls and the no-arbitrage condition is met, the covered 
interest parity condition in Eq (4.3) below provides the resulting relationship between the 
interest rates and the exchange rates. 
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1 + 𝑔𝑔 = (1 + 𝑔𝑔∗) 𝐹𝐹
𝑁𝑁
 (4.3) 
where 𝑔𝑔  is the domestic interest rate, 𝑔𝑔∗  is the foreign interest rate, 𝐹𝐹  is the forward 
exchange rate and 𝑆𝑆 is the spot exchange rate. The parity condition can be written as  
𝑔𝑔 = 𝑔𝑔∗ + 𝐹𝐹−𝑁𝑁
𝑁𝑁
                       (4.4) 
When there are capital controls, the domestic interest rate will deviate from the 
interest rate parity. This deviation can be used as a way to measure how effective the 
capital controls are. Following Otani and Tiwari (1981), the deviation is defined as Gap 𝐺𝐺, 
which is randomly distributed and has an expected value of zero. 
𝐺𝐺~𝑅𝑅(0,   𝜎𝜎2)               (4.5) 
where 𝐺𝐺 ≡ (1+𝑖𝑖)𝑁𝑁(1+𝑖𝑖∗)𝐹𝐹 − 1             (4.6) 
When there is no capital controls or other transaction cost, the expected value of 𝐺𝐺 
should be zero. But when we have to consider capital controls and other transaction cost, 
𝐺𝐺 becomes to the following.  
𝐺𝐺~𝑅𝑅(∅,   𝜎𝜎2)  (4.7) 
where ∅ ≠ 0. Here 𝐺𝐺 can be treated as the total transaction costs including the cost caused 
by capital controls. This 𝐺𝐺 can be used to measure the effectiveness of capital controls. 
The bigger the estimate of 𝐺𝐺 is, the more effective the capital controls are.  
Overall, we can use OLS regression in Eq (4.4) to see how much the domestic 
interest rate is explained and 𝐺𝐺 to see how much the deviation is from interest rate parity, 
getting the effective of capital controls. 
 
4.4.4 Real Interest Rate Differentials 
Similar to covered interest rate parity, real interest rates in different countries 
should converge under the condition of free capital mobility. So we can use real interest 
rate differentials as way to examine if there are capital controls. The stricter the capital 
controls are, the greater the interest rate differentials are. See, inter alia, Frankel and 
MacArthur (1988) and Frankel (1992). 
The real interest rate differential is defined as follows:  
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𝑛𝑛 − 𝑛𝑛∗ = (𝑔𝑔 − 𝜋𝜋) − (𝑔𝑔∗ − 𝜋𝜋∗)  (4.8) 
where 𝑛𝑛  and 𝑛𝑛∗  are domestic and foreign real interest rates, 𝑔𝑔  and 𝑔𝑔∗  are domestic and 
foreign nominal interest rates, and 𝜋𝜋 and 𝜋𝜋∗ are domestic and foreign expected inflation 
rate. By subtracting and adding forward discount, Eq (4.8) can be re-written as:  
𝑛𝑛 − 𝑛𝑛∗ = (𝑔𝑔 − 𝑔𝑔∗ − 𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔) + (𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 − 𝜋𝜋 + 𝜋𝜋∗)  (4.9) 
where 𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 is the forward discount. Eq (4.9) shows that the real interest rate differential can 
be decomposed into two terms. The first term is interest differential less forward discount 
and called the country premium.  The second term is forward discount less inflation 
differential.  According to covered interest rate parity and purchasing power parity, these 
two terms should be zero under ideal conditions, so the real interest rate differential can 
be zero. 
We check if the real interest rate parity holds as in Eq (4.8), and if the two terms 
defined in Eq (4.9) are close to zero as test of effectiveness of China’s capital controls. 
 
4.4.5 The Edwards-Kahn Model 
Edwards and Kahn (1985) propose a method to test the effectiveness of capital 
controls in developing countries based on the interest rate formation mechanism. They fit 
a country's economy into one of three categories according to its openness. It is completely 
closed when a country’s current account and capital account are closed, so the interest rate 
is determined by domestic money market equilibrium. It is completely open when a 
country allows free capital mobility, so the domestic interest rate is determined by the 
interest rate parity. It is semi-open, most developing countries fall into this category, when 
there are more or less restrictions on capital flows. Therefore, interest rates are determined 
by both domestic and foreign factors, which can be expressed as a weighted average of 
interest rate derived from interest rate parity and interest rate derived from domestic money 
market equilibrium.  
Following this idea, interest rate in a closed economy can be expressed as this 
equation.  
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𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 = 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑   (4.10) 
where 𝑔𝑔  is the nominal interest rate, 𝑛𝑛  is the real interest rate, and 𝜋𝜋𝑑𝑑  is the expected 
inflation rate. The equilibrium demand for money is 
𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝛼𝛼2(𝜌𝜌 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑) − 𝛼𝛼3𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑   (4.11) 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑 is real demand for money, 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 is real GDP, 𝜌𝜌 is the long-run equilibrium real 
interest rate.  
Interest rate in an open economy can be expressed as following to meet interest rate 
parity.  
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡∗ + ?̇?𝑒𝑡𝑡   (4.12) 
where 𝑔𝑔∗  is the foreign interest rate, ?̇?𝑒 is the expected change of exchange rate. If we 
consider that there are frictions and lags in the financial market to adjust the domestic 
interest rate to the equilibrium level, Eq (4.12) will become 
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃(𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡∗ + ?̇?𝑒𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡−1   (4.13) 
where 𝜃𝜃 is the adjustment parameter which is between 0 and 1, and it indicates how fast 
the financial market adjusts.  
The general case, where most developing countries can fall into, is between a closed 
economy and an open economy. If we assign weight 𝜓𝜓 and 1 − 𝜓𝜓 to Eq (4.13) and (4.10) 
respectively, we can get 
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 = 𝜓𝜓𝜃𝜃(𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡∗ + ?̇?𝑒𝑡𝑡) + 𝜓𝜓(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜓𝜓)(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑)        (4.14) 
𝜓𝜓 and 𝜃𝜃 are two important parameters in this model. When 𝜓𝜓 is bigger, the country is more 
open; when 𝜃𝜃 is bigger, the domestic financial markets adjust faster to foreign shocks; both 
mean less capital controls. If 𝜓𝜓 = 𝜃𝜃 = 1, it goes back to interest parity, and if 𝜓𝜓 = 0, it 
goes back to closed economy. To substitute Eq (4.11) into Eq (4.14), we can get the 
equation for nominal interest rate 
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1(𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡∗ + ?̇?𝑒𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿2𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿4𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝛿5𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡   (4.15) 
where the reduced-form parameters 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 are 
𝛿𝛿0 = (1 − 𝜓𝜓)[𝜌𝜌 + 𝜆𝜆(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛼𝛼0 − 𝛼𝛼2𝜌𝜌)] 
𝛿𝛿1 = 𝜓𝜓𝜃𝜃 
𝛿𝛿2 = (1 − 𝜓𝜓)𝜆𝜆(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝛼𝛼1 
𝛿𝛿3 = −(1 − 𝜓𝜓)𝜆𝜆(1 − 𝛽𝛽) 
𝛿𝛿4 = (1 − 𝜓𝜓)[1 − 𝜆𝜆(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛼𝛼3)] 
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𝛿𝛿5 = 𝜓𝜓(1 − 𝜃𝜃) 
Eq (4.15) is the regression equation I use to obtain the value of 𝜓𝜓 and 𝜃𝜃 from the 
estimated value of 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖. 
 
4.5 Data Description 
The data that this chapter needs to use for these five methods can be described as 
follows. For the two de jure indicators I will use in this chapter, we can get the data from 
authors’ websites directly. For the FKRSU indicator, the data range is from 1995 to 2015, 
and value is from 0 to 1. The larger the value is, the stricter the capital controls. For the 
Chinn-Ito indicator, the data range is from 1984 to 2015, and the value is from -1.90 from 
2.37. Contrary to the previous indicator, the larger the value is, the less capital controls 
there are. Both are annual data.  
For the saving-investment test, I compare China with the US, the UK and Japan. I 
will use national saving rate and domestic capital formation rate for saving and investment 
respectively. Annual data of these four countries are obtained from World Bank, and the 
range is from 1970 to 2016.  
For covered interest rate parity, I compare China with the Eurozone and Japan, and 
take the US as the foreign country. The USD LIBOR rate is the foreign interest rate. The 
SHIBOR, EUR LIBOR and JPY LIBOR rates are the domestic interest rates. The 
exchange rates are spot and forward rates of CNY, EUR and JPY against USD. The data 
are daily data from Oct 8, 2006 to Mar 31, 2018. The SHIBOR rate is collected from China 
Foreign Exchange Trade System & Nation Interbank Funding Center, and other data are 
collected from Bloomberg.  
For real interest rate differentials, the data for the interest rates and exchange rates 
are basically the same as the covered interest rate test. But because the CPI is only available 
at monthly level, so the data are monthly data and the range is from 2006M10 to 2018M3.  
For the Edwards-Kahn model, I compare China with the Eurozone and Japan, and 
take the US as the foreign country. The interest rates and exchange rates are the same as 
these used in the covered interest parity test. Actual CPI inflation is used as expected 
inflation. Narrow money aggregate (M1) is used for money stock. These data are quarterly 
data that are collected from Bloomberg, and the range is from 2006Q4 to 2018Q1. 
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4.6 Results and Discussion  
4.6.1 China’s De Jure Indicators  
The FKRSU and Chinn-Ito indicators for China are depicted in Figure 4.6 and 4.7 
respectively. In Figure 4.6, kai means controls on capital inflow, kao means controls on 
capital outflow and ka means the average of kai and kao and the overall capital controls. 
All these indicators are binary, with 1 (0) indicating the presence (absence) of the 
corresponding control measure. This indicator is maintained at 1, which means the 
maximum capital controls, for most of the years. It only falls to a lower level for three 
years from 1997 to 1999, which seems to reflect the financial market turmoil during the 
1997 Asian financial crisis. From 2013, it falls more dramatically, suggesting that the 
Chinese government began removing de jure capital controls in recent years.  
The Chinn-Ito indicator in Figure 4.7 has longer time periods. kaopen means the 
overall openness for both capital inflow and outflow. For most years it is kept at -1.19, 
implying that there is not much change in China’s capital control regime. However, during 
the years from 1987 to 1992 it falls to -1.90 which is the lowest openness level of this 
indicator. During these years, many major events have taken place in the world, for 
example, the Revolutions of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, and the collapse of Japanese asset price bubble, so it is reasonable for China 
to implement additional capital controls. 
 
4.6.2 Empirical Results of De Facto Methods  
In the saving-investment correlation test, we compare China with the US, the UK 
and Japan. The regression results of Eq (4.1) are shown in Table 4.1. According to the 
coefficient of Δ �𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑌𝑌
�
𝑡𝑡
 in these results, all the four countries are significant at 1 percent 
level, and China’s coefficient is 0.992, which is close to 1 and much larger than all other 
countries’. So saving is more correlated to investment in China, which means China’s 
capital controls are very effective in short term. Among the three countries without capital 
controls, this coefficient of the UK is the smallest, which is only 0.328. It is reasonable, 
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because the UK is a much smaller country, comparing to the US and Japan, so capital 
flows have more influence on domestic investment. On the other hand, according to the 
coefficient of �𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑌𝑌
�
𝑡𝑡−1
− �
𝐼𝐼
𝑌𝑌
�
𝑡𝑡−1
 in these results, it is 0.188 for China and significant at 1 
percent level, which is much smaller than the coefficient of Δ �𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑌𝑌
�
𝑡𝑡
. According to the error 
correction model, China’s capital controls are much less effective in long term. For the US 
and the UK, this coefficient is not significant, because they have no capital controls at all. 
Furthermore, China’s 𝑅𝑅2 is the largest among the four countries, which also illustrates that 
domestic investment is more correlated to domestic saving. To check how the 
effectiveness of China’s capital controls changes over years, I use the time-varying 
parameter in Eq (4.2) and get the results shown in Figure 4.8. First, the results are similar 
to the regression results of Eq (4.1), as the saving-investment correlation for China is still 
the largest, and it is still the smallest for the UK. More importantly, the time variation is 
not very significant for China over this long period of time from 1970 to 2016. The time-
varying parameter is always around 1 and only a little smaller in recent years than in 1970s. 
This means China’s capital controls are always very effective. This result is consistent 
with what de jure indicators has shown above. I also find the time-varying parameter for 
the US varies a lot, because it has no capital controls. Overall, through the saving-
investment correlation test, China’s capital controls are very effective in short term and 
this effectiveness remains for very long period of time, but those controls are much less 
effective in long term.  
For interest rate parity, we can compare China with the Eurozone and Japan. The 
regression results of covered interest rate parity as Eq (4.4) are shown in Table 4.2. 
According to the 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔 𝑅𝑅2 , China is different from the other two without capital 
controls a lot. For the Eurozone and Japan, the 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔 𝑅𝑅2  is 0.978 and 0.843 
respectively, so covered interest rate parity can explain their domestic interest rate by 97.8 
percent and 84.3 percent respectively. But for China, the 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔 𝑅𝑅2 is only 0.0125, so 
its domestic interest rate can only be explained 1.25 percent by interest rate parity. 
Therefore, the Eurozone and Japan are in line with interest rate parity, but China is almost 
completely inconsistent with interest rate parity. Considering that the Eurozone and Japan 
have almost no capital controls, this indicates that China's capital controls are very 
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effective. In addition, the coefficient of 𝑔𝑔∗ for the Eurozone is 0.971 which is close to 1, so 
the EUR and USD LIBOR interest rates are highly correlated with each other. For Japan, 
this coefficient is also as high as 0.569. But for China, this coefficient is only -0.0976 
which can be considered as 0, so interest rate parity does not work for China because of 
capital controls. In order to check how much China’s domestic interest rate deviates from 
interest rate parity, I use 𝐺𝐺 defined in Eq (4.6). Table 4.3 shows the mean of 𝐺𝐺 for every 
year from 2006 to 2018. The deviation for China is much larger than the Eurozone and 
Japan for most years. It is more obvious if I show this deviation in Figure 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 
and 4.12. Figure 4.9 is the daily deviation, which is derived from Eq (4.6), for the whole 
sample period, Figure 4.10 is the absolute value of the deviation, Figure 4.11 is 1-year 
moving average of the deviation, and Figure 4.12 is 1-year moving average of the absolute 
value of the deviation. According to these figures, China deviates from interest rate parity 
a lot, which means China’s capital controls are really effective as the discussion above. 
Especially during the financial crisis until 2015, the deviation for China is very large, while 
that for the Eurozone and Japan are close to 0 which means perfect interest rate parity. 
More interestingly, according to Figure 4.9 and 4.11, the deviation is negative for all the 
three countries or region before the 2008 financial crisis, and for the Eurozone and Japan 
it becomes negative again after 2015, but for China it remains positive after the financial 
crisis. According to the definition of 𝐺𝐺 as Eq (4.6), when 𝐺𝐺 > 0, it means 𝑔𝑔 > 𝑔𝑔∗ or 𝑆𝑆 > 𝐹𝐹, 
so there is pressure of capital inflows, and vice versa. Therefore, there is huge pressure of 
capital inflows for China from 2008 to 2015, and China’s capital controls focus on capital 
inflows. The huge increase in China’s foreign reserves shown in Figure 4.1 also happens 
in the same period. Although the deviation for China is smaller after 2015, but it is still on 
the similar level as 2006 to 2009, according to Figure 4.10 and 4.12. So these variations 
of the 𝐺𝐺 may only be because of economic cycles, but not because China relaxes its capital 
controls to this extent. Considering the decline in foreign reserves, China focuses more on 
controls on capital outflows now. To conclude for covered interest rate parity, China 
deviates a lot from the parity, comparing to the Eurozone and Japan without capital 
controls, so China’s capital controls are very effective. But the variations for the deviation 
may be because of economic cycles, and China’s capital controls do not change much.  
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For real interest rate differentials test, results got from Eq (4.8) and (4.9) are shown 
in Table 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 for real interest rate differentials, interest differential less forward 
discount and forward discount less inflation differential respectively. These results are 
quite similar as the results from the covered interest rate parity test, since China has the 
largest deviation from zero. In Table 4.4, the mean of China’s real interest rate differentials 
is 0.123 which is the most significant and much bigger then the Eurozone’s and Japan’s. 
The Table 4.5 shows similar results, so covered interest rate parity can show China’s 
capital controls very well. In Table 4.6, China’s deviation from zero is less then Japan’s, 
so purchasing power parity is not as effective as interest rate parity to illustrate capital 
controls. I also notice China’s deviation from purchasing power parity is negative, because 
of higher inflation in China, while Japan’s is positive, because of deflation. Overall, 
China’s capital controls are very effective compared to those of the Eurozone and Japan.  
For Edwards-Kahn model, the results of the regression Eq (4.15) are shown in Table 
4.7, and I compare China with Eurozone and Japan again. According to the definition of 
𝛿𝛿1 and 𝛿𝛿5 in Eq (4.15), we can get 𝜓𝜓 and 𝜃𝜃 as follows.  
𝜓𝜓 = 𝛿𝛿1 + 𝛿𝛿5 
𝜃𝜃 = 𝛿𝛿1
𝛿𝛿1 + 𝛿𝛿5 
So we can calculate the value of 𝜓𝜓 and 𝜃𝜃 as follows.  
For China 
𝜓𝜓 = 0.557,𝜃𝜃 = 0.066 
For the Eurozone 
𝜓𝜓 = 0.726,𝜃𝜃 = 0.773 
For Japan 
𝜓𝜓 = 0.572,𝜃𝜃 = 0.336 
China’s 𝜓𝜓 is the smallest among the three countries or region, so this is another 
evidence that China has effective capital controls. It should be noted that China’s 𝛿𝛿1 in 
Table 4.7 is not significant, so the 𝜃𝜃 calculated based on that is not significant from 0 either. 
Because the 𝜃𝜃 means how fast the domestic financial market adjusts to foreign changes, 
China’s financial market adjustment is very slow, compared with the Eurozone and Japan. 
This is also an evidence for why China’s capital controls are effective in short term, but 
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much less effective in long term. These results are consistent with the results of the saving-
investment correlation test.  
 
4.6.3 Further Discussion  
According to all the results that I have in this chapter, China’s capital controls are 
still effective, comparing to the US, the UK, the Eurozone and Japan, through all the 
methods including saving-investment correlation test, covered interest rate parity, real 
interest rate differentials and Edwards-Kahn model. From the results of saving-investment 
correlation test and Edwards-Kahn model, I see there is little variation for the effectiveness 
of China’s capital controls, and these results are in line with FKRSU and Chinn-Ito de jure 
indicators which indicate that there is only a little change for China’s regulations on capital 
flows.  
There are more variations in the results of covered interest rate parity method. 
China’s 𝐺𝐺, which is the deviation from the parity, reaches peaks several times around 2008, 
2011 and 2014, so it seems like periodic changes. It is not likely that the effectiveness of 
capital controls has so many variations during several years. Furthermore, China’s 𝐺𝐺 
decreases a lot during 2015 to 2016, which corresponds to the decline of China’s foreign 
reserve after 2014 shown in Figure 4.1 and the tremendous capital outflows during 2015 
to 2016. However, this 𝐺𝐺  recovers to a similar level before the 2008 financial crisis. 
Therefore, 𝐺𝐺 is not only affected by how strict the capital controls are, but also affected by 
many other factors like business cycles. Overall, I think China’s capital controls does not 
change much during these years.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I try to investigate the effectiveness of China’s capital controls 
through different ways. First, I review the history of China's capital controls reform since 
the reform and opening up. And I also analyze China’s foreign reserve decline and the 
capital outflows in China’s capital account. More importantly, I use de jure and de facto 
methods to investigate the effectiveness of China’s capital controls with the most recent 
data.  
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The de jure indicators include FKRSU and Chinn-Ito, both of which does not 
change much during the available periods. This means China’s regulations on capital 
controls does not change much. The FKRSU indicator shows that it declines from 1 to 0.8 
in 2014. So China’s capital controls are just a little less strict than before.  
The de facto methods include saving-investment correlation test, covered interest 
rate parity, real interest rate differentials and Edwards-Kahn model. I compare China with 
the US, the UK and Japan in saving-investment correlation test, and with the Eurozone 
and Japan in covered interest rate parity, real interest rate differentials and Edwards-Kahn 
model. All those methods show that China’s capital controls are very effective. The results 
of saving-investment correlation test show that the effectiveness does not change much 
but only a little weaker in recent years, which is in line with the de jure indicators. The 
deviation from interest rate parity varies a lot during the sample periods, but I think that is 
periodic changes, not because the effectiveness of capital controls is constantly changing. 
Thus, China’s capital controls are still effective. 
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Table 4.1  The Saving-Investment Correlation Test: 1970-2016, yearly 
 China US UK Japan 
Δ �
𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
𝑌𝑌
�
𝑡𝑡
 0.992*** 0.744*** 0.328*** 0.847*** 
 (0.060) (0.098) (0.135) (0.121) 
�
𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆
𝑌𝑌
�
𝑡𝑡−1
− �
𝐼𝐼
𝑌𝑌
�
𝑡𝑡−1
 0.188** 0.0557 0.0528 0.272** 
 (0.079) (0.0428) (0.0491) (0.103) 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜 -0.00358 0.0705 -0.00170 -0.00326 
 (0.00233) (0.0104) (0.00342) (0.00177) 
𝑅𝑅2 0.843 0.732 0.834 0.565 
𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔 𝑅𝑅2 0.837 0.721 0.799 0.545 
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Table 4.2  Covered Interest Rate Parity: 2006/10/8-2018/3/31, daily 
 China Eurozone Japan 
𝑔𝑔∗ -0.0976*** 0.971*** 0.569*** 
 (0.0164) (0.003) (0.006) 
𝐹𝐹 − 𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆
 -0.0542** 4.00*** 2.09*** 
 (0.0262) (0.02) (0.03) 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜 3.88*** 0.310*** 0.209*** 
 (0.03) (0.006) (0.003) 
𝑅𝑅2 0.0133 0.978 0.843 
𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔 𝑅𝑅2 0.0125 0.978 0.843 
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Table 4.3  Deviation from Interest Rate Parity (G) 
Period China Eurozone Japan 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
2006Q4 -0.0149 0.0031 -0.0124 0.0005 -0.0345 0.0003 
2007 -0.00385 0.01013 -0.00705 0.00356 -0.0318 0.0020 
2008 0.0213 0.0204 0.0134 0.0041 -0.0140 0.0044 
2009 0.00852 0.00894 0.00466 0.0019 -0.00102 0.00219 
2010 0.0266 0.0068 0.00392 0.00139 -0.000194 0.000699 
2011 0.0519 0.0058 0.00879 0.00177 -0.000367 0.000456 
2012 0.0353 0.0091 0.00136 0.00253 -0.00140 0.00069 
2013 0.0320 0.0062 -0.000743 0.000270 -0.000556 0.000132 
2014 0.0458 0.0080 -0.000265 0.000657 -0.000361 0.000131 
2015 0.0317 0.0172 -0.00194 0.00075 -0.000769 0.000497 
2016 0.0119 0.0045 -0.00672 0.00103 -0.00419 0.00081 
2017 0.0231 0.0038 -0.0113 0.0011 -0.00839 0.00121 
2018Q1 0.0210 0.0025 -0.0164 0.0015 -0.0137 0.0015 
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Table 4.4  Real Interest Rate Differentials: 2006M10-2018M3, monthly 
 Mean Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval 
China 0.123** 0.614 0.020 to 0.227 
Eurozone 0.017 0.531 -0.073 to 0.106 
Japan 0.056* 0.389 -0.010 to 0.121 
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Table 4.5  Interest Differential Less Forward Discount: 2006M10-2018M03, monthly 
 Mean Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval 
China 0.208*** 0.179 0.177 to 0.238 
Eurozone -0.011* 0.080 -0.025 to 0.002 
Japan -0.075*** 0.120 -0.095 to -0.055 
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Table 4.6  Forward Discount Less Inflation Differential: 2006M10-2018M03, monthly 
 Mean Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval 
China -0.084* 0.578 -0.182 to 0.013 
Eurozone 0.028 0.528 -0.061 to 0.117 
Japan 0.131*** 0.382 0.067 to 0.195 
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Table 4.7  The Edwards-Kahn Model: 2006Q4-2018Q1, quarterly 
 China Eurozone Japan 
∆(𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡∗ + ?̇?𝑒𝑡𝑡): 𝛿𝛿1 0.0368 0.561*** 0.192*** 
 (0.0353) (0.112) (0.056) 
∆𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡: 𝛿𝛿2 0.0783** 0.0483*** 0.00500*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0149) (0.00155) 
∆𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1: 𝛿𝛿3 0.0143* -0.0106** -0.00466*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0040) (0.00150) 
∆𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑: 𝛿𝛿4 -0.0168 -0.0102 0.000304 
 (0.0208) (0.0119) (0.002483) 
∆𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡−1: 𝛿𝛿5 0.520*** 0.165** 0.380*** 
 (0.139) (0.070) (0.113) 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜: 𝛿𝛿0 -0.196** -0.000969 0.00187 
 (0.078) (0.00841) (0.00223) 
𝑅𝑅2 0.341 0.857 0.558 
𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔 𝑅𝑅2 0.254 0.838 0.500 
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Figure 4.1  China’s Foreign Reserves: 1988-2018, monthly 
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Source: The People’s Bank of China 
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Figure 4.2  China’s Annual Foreign Reserves Increase 
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Source: China State Administration of Foreign Exchange  
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Figure 4.3  China's Annual Balance of Payments 
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Source: China State Administration of Foreign Exchange  
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Figure 4.4  China's Quarterly Balance of Payments 
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Figure 4.5  Decomposition of China's Quarterly Non-Reserve Financial Account 
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Figure 4.6  FKRSU De Jure Indicator for Capital Controls (China) 
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Figure 4.7  Chinn-Ito De Jure Indicator for Openness (China) 
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Figure 4.8  Time-Varying Parameter 
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Figure 4.9  Deviation from Interest Rate Parity (G) (daily) 
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Figure 4.10  Absolute Value of G (daily) 
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
.06
.07
06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
China Eurozone Japan  
 
 
 
 
  
 110 
 
Figure 4.11  1-Year Moving Average of G (daily) 
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Figure 4.12  1-Year Moving Average of Absolute Value of G (daily) 
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